[whataretheysaying] Mary Madigan: Fourth generation warfare

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Posted by Mary Madigan:
Fourth generation warfare
http://whataretheysaying.powerblogs.com/posts/1169354400.shtml


   Wretchard is back, and he's posting up a counterterrorism storm. Like
   this on [1]private security contractors bidding to provide services in
   the Sudan:

     Private security contractors with experience in the War on Terror
     are bidding to provide services in the Sudan to support UN
     humanitarian missions with extremely robust capabilities. Global
     Guerrillas notes that "Blackwater USA, the private military company
     that advertises itself as a 'a turnkey solution provider for 4th
     generation warfare' and ... may be making headway in its quest to
     deploy to the Sudan. Last year, the $600 m a year company formed
     Greystone Limited in order to put a better marketing spin on its
     efforts to private the security of UN humanitarian missions --
     given that this new company can draw on Blackwater for
     capabilities, it would be able battalion-sized unit and even its
     own home-brewed aircraft gunship in support of any contract it
     lands. So far, the effort by Greystone to land a contract to
     provide security to one of the world's worst humanitarian disaster
     zones, hasn't made any headway."

     Whether or not Blackwater type security companies will ever be used
     to supplement humanitarian missions, it remains true that the
     private sector is a repository of field experience in the War on
     Terror. Not just in providing physical security but also in the
     provision of services, such as logistics and even intelligence
     analysis. The role played by nongovernment institutions in fighting
     against terrorism has gone largely unstudied.

   Most counterterrorism efforts that don't follow the British model (a
   consistently ineffective mixture of [2]overkill and appeasement) have
   gone largely unstudied. Until we realize that there are other options
   that go beyond bombing it or begging it for mercy (what the [3]Iraq
   Study group calls diplomacy and dialogue), our counterterrorism
   efforts will be bound to fail.

   We also shouldn't depend on the UN to be enthusiastic about using
   groups like Greystone to help the people in Darfur or to fight
   terrorism. The success of these groups in places like Sierra Leone
   show the world how ineffective, morally bankrupt and prohibitively
   expensive the UN is in comparison. Mercenaries and the UN are
   competing for the same business, and frankly, when it comes to
   morality and reliability, the mercenaries have proven in places like
   [4]Sierra Leone that they're a better deal.

   Also at the Belmont Club - [5]using the enemy's strengths against
   them:

     Martin Muckian's key insight, expressed in his article the
     "Structural Vulnerabilities of Networked Insurgencies" in the
     Winter 2006-07 issue of Parameters, is that Islamic insurgencies
     are in many ways the opposite of 20th century insurgencies. In
     contradistinction to "People's War", which relied on the creation
     of a revolutionary infrastructure and emphasized the painstaking
     recruitment of cadres, networked insurgencies such as those in Iran
     are largely built on small cells, such as might be put together by
     half a dozen people meeting in a room. The glue that holds
     networked insurgencies together is both their strength and
     weakness. And the nature of the binding ties explains why
     information warfare is so important in the current struggle...

     * First, attack critical nodes for maximum disruptive effect.

     * Second, networked insurgencies do not necessarily have strong
     political cohesion. Attack the narrative by forcing the insurgency
     to respond to issues that are outside its scope - this can disrupt
     or even fracture the movement as each group responds to the issue
     according to its own ideology.

     * Third, attack the sources of support.

     * Fourth, attack the information technology infrastructure of the
     network.

   Information warfare can accomplish some things, but this is not
   primarily an ideological war. Terrorists can't eat ideology, their
   goals are mostly opportunistic and political. Even [6]Robert Spencer
   would have to admit that the Koran doesn't contain the recipe for
   mixing Semtex. Terrorists, or asymetric war's 'soldiers', require an
   extensive support network. These independent cells are usually well
   hidden, but their financial, political and weapons support systems are
   usually out in the open and they're very vulnerable.

   Asymetric warfare offers the foot soldiers a fair amount of protection
   - they're not uniformed, they use civilian shields, they blend into
   the population. Instead of aiming for the hard targets, we should
   attack the terrorist infrastructure at its weakest points - the
   unprotected middlemen. This includes the politicians, the weapon
   supply chain, the legal and illegal financial network - any part of
   the terrorist infrastructure that's protected only by implausible
   deniability.

   The goal in a war is to destroy the enemy's infrastructure by the most
   efficient means possible. Since these terror supporters are part of
   the terrorist infrastructure, they are enemy combatants and should be
   treated as such. Since they are relatively unprotected, they can be
   removed more quickly, and in more massive numbers, than the terrorist
   foot soldiers.

   When their support structure is weakened, the foot soldiers might
   become easier targets too.

References

   1. http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/01/privately.html
   2. http://www.jcpa.org/jl/vp523.htm
   3. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq_Study_Group
   4. http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/pmc.htm
   5. http://fallbackbelmont.blogspot.com/2007/01/using-enemys-strength-against-them.html
   6. http://www.jihadwatch.org/