[opiniojuris] Chris Borgen: The Other Half of the Picture

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Posted by Chris Borgen:
The Other Half of the Picture
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1202247517.shtml


   Like Roger, and the rest of the Opinio Juris bloggers, I want to thank
   Walter Russell Mead for joining us this week. I found God and Gold to
   be provocative and to contain wonderful insights, particularly
   concerning why the Anglo-Saxon powers have done remarkably well in
   conflicts over the last 300 years.
   But my first comment in this discussion will be less about what Mead
   did analyze in the opening two sections of the book (discussing the
   âclash of civilizationsâ and what may be called the Anglo-Saxon
   diplomatic and warfighting methods), then about what he did not cover.
   By this, I mean that Mead has built a fascinating but largely
   Eurocentric (if I could include the U.S.) narrative. I question this
   not out of some misguided âpolitical correctnessâ but rather because I
   think that to understand properly the Anglo-Saxon encounter with the
   rest of the world, and particularly to understand why some people push
   back, it is vital to give due weight to the beliefs, goals, and
   concerns of those people. Otherwise, one gets only half the picture;
   and a picture which is somewhat rose-tinted, to boot.
   Mead describes what he calls (tongue-in-cheek, I think) âWaspophobiaâ
   and concludes, â[w]hatever we call it, the hatred and fear of white
   Anglo-Saxon Protestants and of all their doings is one of the motors
   driving the world.â (p.58, my emphasis.) A history which gave serious
   weight to the actual desires and fears of those in the periphery of
   this story (that is, the rest of the world besides Western Europe and
   North America) may find that, perhaps, hatred of the powerful WASPs is
   not as important an engine as it may seem. Maybe, instead, the people
   of the periphery were not just reacting against Britain or the U.S.
   but were acting upon their own affirmative visions of what they wanted
   to build. If that is the case, then understanding those plans and
   goals generated in the periphery--and why the U.K. and the U.S. chose
   to react against them, is a key part of the story of how Britain and
   America "made" the modern world.
   If one focused equally on the encounter as it was experienced in the
   countries facing Anglo-Saxon power, then one would not consider the
   issue of âHow They Hate Usâ (the title of Chapter 3) without even
   mentioning Mossadegh or Allende. Or the U.S. backing of the Shah,
   Pinochet, and Duvalier, to give a few examples. It would also be less
   likely that post-World War II history would receive a gloss such as
   âAmerica supported independence drives in the former colonies, and
   then allowed new states to enter the global economic system the U.S.
   was building.â (p. 112) To quote a Haitian folk saying: âHe who is hit
   always remembers. He who hits always forgets.â I think the narrative
   in the opening sections of God and Gold has forgotten the other half
   of the picture.
   It is by forgettingâor by only briefly consideringâthe various
   examples of bad faith or bad acts by the great powers that we come to
   oversimplify the interaction the U.K, the U.S., and the rest of the
   world. Mead summarizes:

     Rich and free but also cold and inhuman: this is how the West looks
     from the Eastâ¦
     It is what Occidentalists look at when they hate and fear the West;
     it is what Waspophobes are talking about when they decry the global
     power and influence of Britain and the United States today. (p.
     175)

   No, they are probbly talking about more than that. And this is missed
   in Meadâs analysis because the opening two sections of God and Gold
   present an essentially a metropolitan history of international
   politics. As Mead puts it:

     To the degree that the story of world power politics in the last
     few centuries has a single overarching plot, that plot is the long
     and continuing rise of the maritime system as its center shifted
     from the United Provinces to the United Kingdom to the United
     States. (p.173)

   I agree with that, as a general matter and, as I stated in the
   opening, I think Mead has much of great insight to say on the
   geopolitical style of the U.K and the U.S. But this story only goes so
   far; it is one in which great powers were trying to outmaneuver each
   other on the chessboard that is the rest of the world. The board, and
   the chessmen on it, are barely described. And, at least the way the
   first two sections of this book read, the board and the gamepieces are
   acted upon, they are not actors in this story.
   Giving serious attention not just to the power politics and economic
   and social proclivities of the U.K. and the U.S., but also to those of
   states on the periphery, can lead to further insights as to the role
   of Anglo-Saxon power in the world, besides those that Mead has
   presented.