[maverickphilosopher] William F. Vallicella: Presentism and Causation: A Question for Alan Rhoda

[maverickphilosopher at lists.powerblogs.com]

Posted by William F. Vallicella:
Presentism and Causation:  A Question for Alan Rhoda
http://maverickphilosopher.powerblogs.com/posts/1135991590.shtml


   Presentism is the view that whatever exists, exists now. The past is
   no longer, the future is not yet; the present alone exists. Presentism
   upholds the natural intuition that time is radically different from
   space. Everyone will agree that the occupants of spatial positions
   distant from an arbitrarily chosen here exist just as robustly as here
   and its occupants exist. No one will say that whatever exists, exists
   here. But we are inclined to say that only what exists now exists.

   ([1]show)

   Presentism is very attractive, but how can it accommodate the fact of
   causation? Consider the following argument:

     1. If x is the cause of y, then both x and y exist. 2. Some
     temporally present items are caused by items that are not
     temporally present. Therefore 3. Some items exist that are not
     present.

   Suppose the barking of the dog startles the cat. Both events must
   exist if they are to stand in the causal relation. (This is a special
   case of the proposition that the obtaining of any genuine relation
   entails the existence of its relata. Intentionality is not a
   relation.)But the barking is temporally prior to the being startled.
   So the barking exists even though it is not present -- which
   contradicts presentism.

   John Bigelow ("Presentism and Properties," Phil. Perspectives,
   1996)deals with this objection by taking a page from the Stoics. He
   maintains that the relata of the causal relation are not events one
   temporally prior to the other, but presently true propositions. Thus,
   it is now true that the dog barked (past tense) and now true that the
   cat is alarmed (present tense). If this suggestion can be made to
   work, then we can reject premise (2) of the above argument. For then
   both cause and effect exist at present.

   Unfortunately, there is a problem with Bigelow's suggestion. The
   past-tense proposition that the dog barked, being both singular and
   contingent, is in dire need of a truthmaker. There is need of an
   ontological ground of its truth. The truthmaker principle states
   (roughly) that true truth-bearers (subject to certain restrictions)
   require worldly truthmakers. I hope the principle is intuitive; in any
   case, I won't explain it further here.

   Now if presentism is true, i.e., if only temporally present items
   exist, and The dog barked needs a truthmaker, the question arises as
   to what that truthmaker could be. A truthmaker obviously must exist to
   do its job, which implies that it must exist now, given presentism.
   [2]Alan Rhoda in his paper [3]Presentism, Truthmakers, and God tackles
   the question whether presentism is consistent with the truthmaker
   principle. What exercises him are questions about statements about the
   past. Since many of them require truthmakers, how is that possible
   given presentism? His solution, roughly, is that the truthmakers of
   statements about the past are divine memories.

   My question for Rhoda is this. How does he understand causation? Is it
   necessary to bring in God for an adequate account of causation in the
   natural world? If yes, is there a drift towards occasionalism?

   ([4]hide)

References

   1. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/maverickphilosopher/posts/1135991590.html
   2. http://www.alanrhoda.net/
   3. http://www.alanrhoda.net/papers/Presentism,%20Truthmakers,%20and%20God.pdf
   4. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/maverickphilosopher/posts/1135991590.html