[inteldump] Phillip Carter: Counterproductive Counterinsurgency

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Posted by Phillip Carter:
Counterproductive Counterinsurgency
http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/archives/archive_2007_07_01-2007_07_07.shtml#1183735297


   Laura King [1]reports in today's Los Angeles Times about a disturbing
   increase in civilian casualties in Afghanistan. The surge has resulted
   from increasingly aggressive air and ground assaults by U.S.-led
   forces there, as well as continuing barbaric assaults by the Taliban
   which specifically target civilians. Everyone agrees that the deaths
   are a problem, but no one seems to agree on who bears ultimate
   responsibility:

     the growing toll is causing widespread disillusionment among the
     Afghan people, eroding support for the government of President
     Hamid Karzai and exacerbating political rifts among NATO allies
     about the nature and goals of the mission in Afghanistan.
     More than 500 Afghan civilians have been reported killed this year,
     and the rate has dramatically increased in the last month.
     In some instances, it was difficult to determine whether the dead
     were combatants or noncombatants. But in many other cases, there
     was no doubt that the person killed was a bystander to war.
     Still, Western military leaders argue that any comparison of
     casualties caused by Western forces and by the Taliban is
     fundamentally unfair because there is a clear moral distinction to
     be made between accidental deaths resulting from combat operations
     and deliberate killings of innocents by militants.
     "No [Western] soldier ever wakes up in the morning with the
     intention of harming any Afghan citizen," said Maj. John Thomas, a
     spokesman for the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force.
     "If that does inadvertently happen, it is deeply, deeply
     regretted."
     Moreover, alliance officials say Taliban fighters are ultimately to
     blame for many of the fatalities attributed to coalition military
     operations because the insurgents deliberately place civilians in
     harm's way, using them as human shields and employing other brutal
     tactics.
     Human rights groups acknowledge that there are mitigating
     circumstances. But to the families of victims such as Azizullah the
     salt merchant, such distinctions are lost in a wave of grief and
     indignation.

   In counterinsurgency, the people are the objective. Earning through
   support through carefully calibrated political, economic and security
   operations is the brass ring of this kind of war -- often sought,
   almost never obtained. As my colleague [2]Abu Muqawama has argued,
   airpower is virtually anathema for this kind of conflict. The smart
   minds who came together to write the Army and Marine Corps' [3]new
   counterinsurgency doctrine agreed, writing:

     E-5. Precision air attacks can be of enormous value in COIN
     operations; however, commanders exercise exceptional care when
     using airpower in the strike role. Bombing, even with the most
     precise weapons, can cause unintended civilian casualties.
     Effective leaders weigh the benefits of every air strike against
     its risks. An air strike can cause collateral damage that turns
     people against the host-nation (HN) government and provides
     insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when justified
     under the law of war, bombings that result in civilian casualties
     can bring media coverage that works to the insurgentsâ benefit. For
     example, some Palestinian militants have fired rockets or artillery
     from near a school or village to draw a retaliatory air strike that
     kills or wounds civilians. If that occurs, the insurgents display
     those killed and wounded to the media as victims of aggression.
     E-6. Even when destroying an obvious insurgent headquarters or
     command center, counterinsurgents must take care to minimize
     civilian casualties. New, precise munitions with smaller blast
     effects can limit collateral damage. When considering the risk of
     civilian casualties, commanders must weigh collateral damage
     against the unintended consequences of taking no action. Avoiding
     all risk may embolden insurgents while providing them sanctuary.
     The proper and well-executed use of aerial attack can conserve
     resources, increase effectiveness, and reduce risk to U.S. forces.
     Given timely, accurate intelligence, precisely delivered weapons
     with a demonstrated low failure rate, appropriate yield, and proper
     fuse can achieve desired effects while mitigating adverse effects.
     However, inappropriate or indiscriminate use of air strikes can
     erode popular support and fuel insurgent propaganda. For these
     reasons, commanders should consider the use of air strikes
     carefully during COIN operations, neither disregarding them
     outright nor employing them excessively.

   One important point that frequently gets lost is that the ground force
   commander is usually the one who calls for and targets and airstrike.
   Commanders on the ground must appreciate the larger effects of these
   strikes as they call them in, and carefully decide whether the
   benefits of the strike outweigh those collateral risks.
   But there is a larger problem here. [4]The U.S. Air Force continues to
   insist that airpower is the answer -- that our troops on the ground
   need responsive firepower, and that airpower is the best way to kill
   the enemy. And if we can just kill enough of them, we'll win. Today's
   Air Force leaders go so far as to suggest that the new orthodoxy on
   counterinsurgency is wrong to marginalize airpower as a supporting
   force:

     The strange comments about the applications of modern airpower are
     contained in the dead-last, five-page annex to a brand-new 335-page
     Army-Marine Corps combined arms doctrine on counterinsurgency (or
     âCOINâ), co-signed by Petraeus and Marine Corps Lt. Gen. James F.
     Amos. Field Manual 3-24 was published in December.
     * * *
     The views in FM 3-24 reflect a limited knowledge of airpowerâs true
     role in the current operation and suspicion that airpower can all
     too easily prove counterproductive. This is all the more
     distressing in light of the view that Petraeus will set direction
     for the ongoing fight in Iraq.
     The new doctrine argues that airpower is best put under control of
     a tactical ground commander or, at the highest level, the
     multinational force commander, but not an airman.
     * * *
     USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful
     âasymmetricâ capability and certainly endorses the view that
     ISRâair and space-based systems alikeâare critical.
     However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrineâs tendency
     to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM
     3-24 does âprobably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential
     for collateral damage,â because the Air Force exercises great care
     in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible
     to achieve the desired effect.
     The notion that the Air Force applies âindiscriminateâ power is
     obsolete and wrong, he said, adding, âWe do not go out and do
     carpet bombing.â Moreover, worries about errant attacks should be
     extended to âinclude artillery and mortars,â which are imprecise
     when compared with laser or satellite guided bombs.
     [Maj. Gen. Allen G.] Peck went on to say Petraeus and Amos did not
     adequately take account of the contribution of airpowerâs speed,
     range, and flexibility. âI would have liked to have seen more
     discussion, throughout the document, ... about how ground
     commanders can leverage this asymmetric capability in the fight,â
     said Peck. âI think that is a shortfall.â

   To be sure, the Air Force brings something to the fight. But we can't
   just use the Air Force because we have it, or try to apply its overly
   kinetic forms of firepower to the sensitive problems of
   counterinsurgency, just because we've paid billions of dollars for
   these airframes and bombs. If the choice comes down to sidelining the
   Air Force or winning the war, we better damn well choose the latter.
   Letting force structure, procurement considerations or service
   parochialism drive operations is flat-out stupid. That is the point of
   this Los Angeles Times article is to remind us that there are limits
   to the utility of the American Way of War, and that we should be wary
   of solutions for this kind of war which emphasize firepower or
   technology. Counterinsurgency is, at its core, a human endeavor. It
   requires careful discrimination, targeting and calibration in the use
   of force. In Afghanistan, we have started down a dangerous path of
   error towards losing the support of the people. These airstrikes may
   succeed in killing a few suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters. But
   'twould be a shame to see these strikes result in us losing the war.

References

   1. http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-civilian6jul06,0,4449979.story?coll=la-home-center
   2. http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2007/05/insanity-in-afghanistan.html
   3. http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/COIN-FM3-24.pdf
   4. http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2007/0307watch.asp