[inteldump] Phillip Carter: Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for thou art with me . . .
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Wed Dec 26 17:55:38 EST 2007
Posted by Phillip Carter:
Yea, though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for thou art with me . . .
http://inteldump.powerblogs.com/posts/1198709735.shtml
[1]In this month's issue of Vanity Fair, Sebastian Junger has a truly
breathtaking dispatch from a combat journalism tour with 2nd Platoon,
[2]Battle Company, [3]2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment, deployed
in Afghanistanâs dangerous Korengal Valley. According to Junger, the
valley is considered most dangerous place in Afghanistan: nearly
one-fifth of all combat in Afghanistan occurs in this valley, and
nearly three-quarters of all the bombs dropped by NATO forces in
Afghanistan are dropped in the surrounding area. Junger describes the
combat he saw in stark terms: "The fighting is on foot and it is
deadly, and the zone of American control moves hilltop by hilltop,
ridge by ridge, a hundred yards at a time. There is literally no safe
place in the Korengal Valley. Men have been shot while asleep in their
barracks tents."
The story continues with several vignettes from Junger's time with 2nd
Platoon. Together, these pieces illustrate how tough the fighting in
Afghanistan has become; how much resilience the Taliban and Al Qaeda
have; the complex nature of the counterinsurgency fight there. Here's
a snippet:
Second Platoon is one of four in Battle Company, which covers the
Korengal as part of the Second Battalion of the 503rd Infantry
Regiment (Airborne). The only soldiers to have been deployed more
times since the September 11 attacks are from the 10th Mountain
Division, which handed the Korengal over last June. (Tenth Mountain
had been slated to go home three months earlier, but its tour was
extended while some of its units were already on their way back.
They landed in the United States and almost immediately got back on
their planes.) When Battle Company took over the Korengal, the
entire southern half of the valley was controlled by the Taliban,
and American patrols that pushed even a few hundred yards into that
area got attacked.
If there was one thing Battle Company knew how to do, though, it
was fight. Its previous deployment had been in Afghanistanâs Zabul
Province, and things were so bad there that half the company was on
psychiatric meds by the time they got home. Korengal looked like it
would be even worse. In Zabul, they had been arrayed against
relatively inexperienced youths who were paid by Taliban commanders
in Pakistan to fightâand die. In the Korengal, on the other hand,
the fighting is funded by al-Qaeda cells who oversee extremely
well-trained local militias. Battle Company took its first casualty
within days, a 19-year-old private named Timothy Vimoto. Vimoto,
the son of the brigadeâs command sergeant major, was killed by the
first volley from a Taliban machine gun positioned around half a
mile away. He may well not have even heard the shots.
I went to the Korengal Valley to follow Second Platoon throughout
its 15-month deployment. To get into the valley, the American
military flies helicopters to the Korengal Outpostâthe kop, as itâs
knownâroughly halfway down the valley. The kop has a landing zone
and a clutch of plywood hooches and barracks tents and perimeter
walls made of dirt-filled hesco barriers, many now shredded by
shrapnel. When I arrived, Second Platoon was stationed primarily at
a timber-and-sandbag outpost named Firebase Phoenix. There was no
running water or power, and the men took fire nearly every day from
Taliban positions across the valley and from a ridgeline above them
that they called Table Rock.
I spent a couple of weeks with Second Platoon and left at the end
of June, just before things got bad. The Taliban ambushed a patrol
in Aliabad, mortally wounding the platoon medic, Private Juan
Restrepo, and then hammered a column of Humvees that tore out of
the kop to try to save him. Rounds rattled off the armor plating of
the vehicles, and rocket-propelled grenades plowed into the
hillsides around them. One day in July, Captain Daniel Kearney, the
27-year-old commanding officer of Battle Company, counted 13
firefights in a 24-hour period. A lot of the contact was coming
from Table Rock, so Kearney decided to end that problem by putting
a position on top of it. Elements of the Second and Third Platoons
and several dozen local workers moved up the ridge after dark and
hacked furiously at the shelf rock all night long so that they
would have some minimal cover when dawn broke.
A Black Hawk helicopter comes in to land on the roof of a village
house in Yaka China to take out Captain Dan Kearney following a
village meeting to discuss insurgent activity.
Sure enough, daylight brought bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire that
sent the men diving into the shallow trenches they had just dug.
They fought until the shooting stopped and then they got back up
and continued to work. There was no loose dirt up there to fill the
sandbags, so they broke up the rock with pickaxes and then shoveled
pieces into the bags, which they piled up to form crude bunkers.
Someone pointed out that they were actually ârock bags,â not
sandbags, and so ârock bagsâ became a platoon joke that helped them
get through the next several weeks. They worked in 100-degree heat
in full body armor and took their breaks during firefights, when
they got to lie down and return fire. Sometimes they were so badly
pinned down that they just lay there and threw rocks over their
heads into the hescos.
But rock bag by rock bag, hesco by hesco, the outpost got built. By
the end of August the men had moved roughly 10 tons of dirt and
rock by hand. They named the outpost Restrepo, after the medic who
was killed, and succeeded in taking the pressure off Phoenix mainly
by redirecting it onto themselves. Second Platoon began taking fire
several times a day, sometimes from distances as close as a hundred
yards. The terrain drops off so steeply from the position that
their heavy machine guns couldnât angle downward enough to cover
the slopes below, so the Taliban could get very close without being
exposed to fire. Lieutenant Piosa had his men lay coils of
concertina wire around the position and rig claymore mines
hardwired to triggers inside the bunkers. If the position were in
danger of getting overrun, the men could detonate the claymores and
kill everything within 50 yards.
On the shelf of nearly every Army officer, you'll find a book by
retired Col. T.R. Fehrenbach on the Korean conflict titled [4]This
Kind of War. At the end of World War II, confronted by the military
revolution brought on by the atomic bomb, America cut its military
from a wartime high of 16 million down to a few hundred thousand.
Bombs and airplanes -- not soldiers -- would now protect America's
shores and cities. After fighting as a grunt in Korea, Fehrenbach
thought otherwise. Transformation was great for the Air Force and
Navy, but for the Army and Marine Corps, the essential nature of
warfare remained unchanged. Unfortunately, many in the defense
community have still not learned this [5]basic lesson, that humans are
more important than hardware, and that the human element of warfare is
paramount.
"You may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize it,
pulverize it and wipe it clean of life," wrote Fehrenbach. "But if you
desire to defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization, you
must do this on the ground, the way the Roman legions did, by putting
your young men into the mud."
That was true 55 years ago in the harsh mountains of Korea, and it is
true today in the rugged mountains of Afghanistan.
References
Visible links
1. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/01/afghanistan200801
2. http://www.173abnbde.setaf.army.mil/2-503rd/BATTLE.html
3. http://www.173abnbde.setaf.army.mil/2-503rd/home.htm
4. http://www.amazon.com/This-Kind-War-Fiftieth-Anniversary/dp/1574882597
5. http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2003/0306.carter.html
Hidden links:
6. http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2008/01/afghanportraits_slideshow200801
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