[Dean's World] Dave Price: Why We're Winning Now

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Posted by Dave Price:
Why We're Winning Now
http://www.deanesmay.com/posts/1191014609.shtml


   Frederick Kagan [1]explains why the oft-neglected qualitative shift
   (most news articles simply refer to a quantitative "troop build-up")
   of the "surge" -- protecting Iraqis -- has succeeded where previous
   efforts failed.

     Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the consensus of American
     strategists has been that the best way to fight a cellular
     terrorist organization like al Qaeda is through a combination of
     targeted strikes against key leaders and efforts to discredit al
     Qaeda's takfiri ideology in the Muslim community. Precision-guided
     munitions and special forces have been touted as the ideal weapons
     against this sort of group, because they require a minimal presence
     on the ground and therefore do not create the image of American
     invasion or occupation of a Muslim country.
     A correlative assumption has often been that the visible presence
     of Western troops in Muslim lands creates more terrorists than it
     eliminates. The American attack on the Taliban in 2001 is often
     held up now--as it was at the time--as an exemplar of the right way
     to do things in this war: Small numbers of special forces worked
     with indigenous Afghan resistance fighters to defeat the Taliban
     and drive out al Qaeda without the infusion of large numbers of
     American ground forces. For many, Afghanistan is the virtuous war
     (contrasting with Iraq) not only because it was fought against the
     group that planned the 9/11 attacks, but also because it was fought
     in accord with accepted theories of fighting cellular terrorist
     organizations.
     This strategy failed in Iraq for four years--skilled U.S.
     special-forces teams killed a succession of al Qaeda in Iraq
     leaders, but the organization was able to replace them faster than
     we could kill them. A counterterrorism strategy that did not secure
     the population from terrorist attacks led to consistent increases
     in terrorist violence and exposed Sunni leaders disenchanted with
     the terrorists to brutal death whenever they tried to resist. It
     emerged that "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population
     is not enough when the terrorists are able to torture and kill
     anyone who tries to stand up against them.

   Read the whole thing. This point cannot be made often enough -- which
   is probably why [2]Michael Totten keeps mentioning this crucial piece
   of the new counterinsurgency strategy:
   Sometimes, the More You Protect Your Force, the Less Secure You May Be
   1-149. Ultimate success in COIN [Counter-insurgency] is gained by
   protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain
   in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be
   running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents. Aggressive
   saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening post operations must be
   conducted, risk shared with the populace, and contact maintained. . .
   . These practices ensure access to the intelligence needed to drive
   operations. Following them reinforces the connections with the
   populace that help establish real legitimacy.
   From âCounterinsurgency/FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.

References

   1. http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110010665
   2. http://www.michaeltotten.com/