[Dean's World] Aziz P: let's talk about the NIE

[notify at powerblogs.com]

Posted by Aziz P:
let's talk about the NIE
http://www.deanesmay.com/posts/1159362583.shtml


   Whether it was treason or not to leak it, the NIE is out and
   represents the authentic concensus of the intelligence community.
   Therefore I think it warrants debate. If you want to discuss the
   treason issue or bush hatred or whatnot, then Dean's previous post is
   a good place for that. But my aim here is to take on the NIE on the
   merits. The full NIE is listed below the fold, so let's take a look.

   Thanks to [1]Tim at Balloon Juice for the manual transcription from
   PDF. Transcription follows, and also cross-posted at Nation-Building.

   ([2]show)

   United States-led counterterrorism efforts have seriously damaged the
   leadership of al-Qa'ida and disrupted its operations; however, we
   judge that al-Qa'ida will continue to pose the greatest threat to the
   Homeland and US interests abroad by a single terrorist organization.
   We also assess that the global jihadist movement--which includes
   al-Qa'ida, affiliated and independent terrorist groups, and emerging
   networks and cells--is spreading and adapting to counterterrorism
   efforts.

     * Although we cannot measure the extent of the spread with
       precision, a large body of all-source reporting indicates that
       activists identifying themselves as jihadists, although a small
       percentage of Muslims, are increasing in both number and
       geographic dispersion.
     * If this trend continues, threats to US interests at home and
       abroad will become more diverse, leading to increasing attacks
       worldwide.
     * Greater pluralism and more responsive political systems in Muslim
       majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances jihadists
       exploit. Over time, such progress, together with sustained,
       multifaceted programs targeting the vulnerabilities of the
       jihadist movement and continued pressure on al-Qa'ida, could erode
       support for the jihadists. ï
       ï
       We assess that the global jihadist movement is decentralized,
       lacks a coherent global strategy, and is becoming more diffuse.
       New jihadist networks and cells, with anti-American agendas, are
       increasingly likely to emerge. The confluence of shared purpose
       and dispersed actors will make it harder to find and undermine
       jihadist groups.

     * We assess that the operational threat from self-radicalized cells
       will grow in importance to US counterterrorism efforts,
       particularly abroad but also in the Homeland.
     * The jihadists regard Europe as an important venue for attacking
       Western interests. Extremist networks inside the extensive Muslim
       diasporas in Europe facilitate recruitment and staging for urban
       attacks, as illustrated by the 2004 madrid and 2005 London
       bombings.

   We assess that the Iraq jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist
   leaders and operatives; perceived jihadist success there would inspire
   more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.

     * The Iraq conflict has become the "cause celebre" for jihadists,
       breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world
       and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.
       Should jihadists leaving Iraq perceive themselves, and be
       perceived, to have failed, we judge fewer fighters will be
       inspired to carry on the fight.

   We assess that the underlying factors fueling the spread of the
   movement outweigh its vulnerabilities and are likely to do so for the
   duration of the timeframe of the Estimate.

     * Four underlying factors are fueling the spread of the jihadist
       movement: (1) Entrenched grievances, such as corruption,
       injustice, and fear of Western domination, leading to anger,
       humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness; (2) the Iraq "jihad;"
       (3) the slow pace of real and sustained economic, social and
       political reforms among most Muslims - all of which jihadists
       exploit.

   Concomitant vulnerabilities in the jihadist movement have emerged
   that, if fully exposed and exploited, could begin to slow the spread
   of the movement. They include dependence on the continuation of
   Muslim-related conflicts, the limited appeal of the jihadists' radical
   ideology, the emergence of respected voices of moderation, and
   criticism of the violent tactics employed against mostly Muslim
   citizens.

     * The jihadists' greatest vulnerability is that their ultimate
       political solution - an ultra-conservative interpretation of
       shari'a-based governance spanning the Muslim world - is unpopular
       with the vast majority of Muslims. Exposing the religious and
       political straitjacket that is implied by the jihadists'
       propaganda would help to divide them from the audiences they seek
       to persuade.
     * Recent condemnation of violence and extremist religious
       interpretations by a few notable Muslim clerics signal a trend
       that could facilitate the growth of a constructive alternative to
       jihadist ideology; peaceful political activism. This also could
       lead to the consistent and dynamic participation of broader Muslim
       communities in rejecting violence; reducing the ability of
       radicals to capitalize on passive community support. In this way,
       the Muslim mainstream emerges as the most powerful weapon in the
       war on terror.
     * Countering the spread of the jihadist movement will require
       coordinated multilateral efforts that go well beyong operations to
       capture of kill terrorist leaders.

   If democratic reform efforts in Muslim majority nations progress over
   the next five years, political participation probably would drive a
   wedge between intransigent extremists and groups willing to use the
   political process to achieve their local objectives. Nonetheless,
   attendant reforms and potentially destabilizing transitions will
   create new opportunities for jihadists to exploit.

   Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's network, is
   exploiting the
   situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to maintain
   its leadership role.

     * The loss of key leaders, patricularly Usama Bin Ladin, Ayman
       al-Zawahiri, and al-Zarqawi, in rapid succession, probably would
       cause the group to fracture into smaller groups. Although the
       like-minded individuals would endeavor to carry on the mission,
       the loss of these key leaders would exacerbate key strains and
       disagreements. We assess that the resulting splinter groups would,
       at least for a time, pose a less serious threat to US interests
       than does al-Qa'ida.
     * Should al-Zarqawi continue to evade capture and scale back attacks
       against Muslims, we assess that he could broaden his appeal and
       present a global threat.
     * The increased role of Iraqis in managing the operations of
       al-Qa'ida in Iraq might lead veteran foreign jihadists to focus
       their efforts on external operations.

   Other affiliated Sunni extremist organizations, such as Jemaah
   Islamiya, Ansar al-Sunnah, and several North African groups, unless
   countered, are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of
   multiple and mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of
   operation.

     * We assess that such groups pose less of a danger to the Homeland
       than does al-Aa'ida but will pose varying degrees of threat to our
       allies and to US interests abroad. The focus of their attacks is
       likely to ebb and flow between local regime targets and regional
       or global ones.

   We judge that most jihadist groups - both well-known and newly formed
   - will use improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks focused
   primarily on soft targets to implement their asymmetric warfare
   strategy, and that they will attempt to conduct sustained terrorist
   attacks in urban environments. Fighters with experience in Iraq are a
   potential source of leadership for jihadists pursuing these tactics.

     * CBRN capabilities will continue to be sought by these jihadist
       groups.

   While Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, remain the most active state
   sponsors of terrorism, many other states will be unable to prevent
   territory or resources from being exploited by terrorists.

   Anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment is on the rise and fueling
   other radical ideologues. This could prompt some leftist, nationalist
   or separatist to adopt terrorist methods to attack US interests. The
   radicalization process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and
   more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of
   surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be
   difficult to pinpoint.

     * We judge that groups of all stripes will increasingly use the
       Internet to communicatie, propagandize, recruit, train, and obtain
       logistical and financial support.

   ([3]hide)

References

   1. http://www.balloon-juice.com/?p=7376#more-7376
   2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/deanesmay/posts/1159362583.html
   3. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/deanesmay/posts/1159362583.html