[Dean's World] Aziz P: Diebold responds

[notify at powerblogs.com]

Posted by Aziz P:
Diebold responds
http://www.deanesmay.com/posts/1158330578.shtml


   Diebold has [1]responded to the Princeton group's demonstration of how
   easily their voting machines are hacked. In a nutshell, Diebold
   argues:

   1. the software on the unit used by the Princeton researchers was old.
   2. The demo did not take into account physical security procedures.

   Now keep in mind that the Princeton group explicitly said that the
   problems were both software AND hardware related. From their report
   conclusion:

     While some of these problems can be eliminated by improving
     Diebold's software, others cannot be remedied without replacing the
     machines' hardware. Changes to election procedures would also be
     required to ensure security.

   In other words, software can be remedied, but the problem is the
   actual design of the boxes themselves. Diebold does not address that
   in their response.

   With regards to the specifics of point 1, Diebold argues that the new
   software used by the machines is more secure because:

     The current generation AccuVote-TS software â software that is used
     today on AccuVote-TS units in the United States - features the most
     advanced security features, including Advanced Encryption Standard
     128 bit data encryption, Digitally Signed memory card data, Secure
     Socket Layer (SSL) data encryption for transmitted results, dynamic
     passwords, and more.

   Now, I am sorry but this is just a laundry list of techno buzzwords.
   Unless the software is open source how can anyone really know whether
   or not all this fancy stuff is really being implemented effectively?
   My Windows PC has pretty much the same software capabilities but if I
   click on a virus in my email none of that helps me one whit. Just
   listing buzzwords doesn't cut it.

   If Diebold wants to really address the software critique then they
   should give the Princeton group a copy of their software source and
   let them investigate its security (with appropriate non-disclosure
   agreements in force).

   With regards to point 2, physical security procedures are not a
   magical solution. Diebold argues,

     These touch screen voting stations are stand-alone units that are
     never networked together and contain their own individual digitally
     signed memory cards.â

     âIn addition to this extensive security, the report all but ignores
     physical security and election procedures. Every local jurisdiction
     secures its voting machines - every voting machine, not just
     electronic machines. Electronic machines are secured with security
     tape and numbered security seals that would reveal any sign of
     tampering.

   First, if the machines are never designed to be networked together,
   then why are they capable of being networked together? If there's a
   port on the machine then anyone with malicious intent can do what
   Princeton did and network them for a few minutes. This is part of what
   the Princeton group means by problems in hardware.

   Again from the Prinecton report:

     Anyone who has physical access to a voting machine, or to a memory
     card that will later be inserted into a machine, can install said
     malicious software using a simple method that takes as little as
     one minute. In practice, poll workers and others often have
     unsupervised access to the machines.

   Diebold's argument is that some security tape and "local jurisdiction"
   security is sufficient to prevvent the tampering. Their attitude
   smacks of [2]security by obscurity - namely that it doesn't matter if
   there's a security vulnerability as long as no one discovers it or has
   the opportunity to take advantage of it. But obviously it is
   impossible to really secure every voting machine 100%, so in order for
   the system to be trustworthy, the vulnerability itself is what must be
   removed.

   Diebold is in classic software CYA mode. If they have the courage of
   their convictions though, they will give the Princeton group the
   software and see just well their claims of security hold up.

References

   1. http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/news_theswamp/2006/09/diebold_stands_.html
   2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_through_obscurity