[Dean's World] Aziz P: game over

[notify at powerblogs.com]

Posted by Aziz P:
game over
http://www.deanesmay.com/posts/1154464005.shtml


   What is clear is that Hizbollah is not going to be defeated by
   airpower alone. Barring the political will in Israel to mount a
   full-scale invasion of Lebanon up to the Litani river, the presence of
   Hizbollah in southern Lebanon is unlikely to be dislodged; continued
   air campaign by Israel will only serve to strengthen Hizbollah's
   appeal to the ordinary citizens of Lebanon caught in the middle and
   who are in no position to understand the subtleties of the situation
   aside from their immediate perceptions: that their homes, their
   children, their propserity, so fragile and hard-won after long years
   of civil war and Syrian occupation, are being systematically
   destroyed.

   What is also clear is that any suggestion that an international
   peacekeeping force go into southern Lebanon, without at least a week
   of cease-fire in advance, is a non-starter. If Israel is desirous of
   the Blue Helmet excuse to save face for its failure to dislodge
   Hizbollah, they will have to take the first step.

   With new revelations that there were not even any Hizbollah targets in
   Qana at the time of the deadly and tragic strike that so shatterred
   Israel's moral momentum, at best Israel stands to return to the
   pre-hostility status quo; at worst, Lebanon's collapse and the vastly
   increased threat of a formative fundamentalist state at its northern
   doorstep. A stable and democratic Lebanon was Israel's best guarantor
   of security, had she had the patience to let it's fragile roots take
   hold.

   That Israel has lost, and Hizbollah has won, is the immutable
   conclusion of all but the most uninformed or ideological of observers.
   And this newfound realism is evident in all corners of Israel's sphere
   of sympathy. [1]No winning trategy, writes the National Review:

     The administration hopes to forge a meaningful international force
     to help the Lebanese army police southern Lebanon. We hope it can.
     But it may be an unachievable goal, given that countries are
     unlikely to contribute troops unless the environment is more
     âpermissiveâ than it will ever be as long as Hezbollah exists in
     any form. The desire of the sovereign government of Lebanon to take
     southern Lebanon from Hezbollah, meanwhile, could also be in doubt
     now that the guerrilla group is experiencing a surge of support in
     the country (thereâs no denying that the Israeli offensive has come
     at a humanitarian and political price). In the end, Israel might be
     forced to settle for another long war of attrition with Hezbollah,
     coupling air attacks and occasional thrusts on the ground aimed at
     keeping it from again building up significant rocket capabilities
     with ongoing attempts to kill top Hezbollah leaders.

     This would be far from an ideal result, but it beats what the
     âinternational communityâ wants â a ceasefire that would end with
     Hezbollah right back on the border â and it might be the best that
     can be hoped for as long as the United States and Israel are
     fundamentally in a defensive posture in the region.

   Meanwhile, Ralph Peters (hardly noted for his softness on terror or
   sympathy for Arab culture) offers [2]a bleak post-mortem on the folly
   of "easy" victory - a temptation that Israel gave in to all too
   readily:

     All efforts to make war easy, cheap or bloodless fail. If Israel's
     government - or our own - goes to war, our leaders must accept the
     price of winning. You can't measure out military force by
     teaspoons. Such naive efforts led to the morass in Iraq - and to
     the corpses of Qana.

     Despite one failure after another, the myth of antiseptic
     techno-war, of immaculate victories through airpower, persists. The
     defense industry fosters it for profit, and the notion is seductive
     to politicians: a quick win without friendly casualties.

     The problem is that it never works. Never.

     Even the Kosovo conflict - frequently cited as an airpower victory
     - only climaxed after we threatened to send in ground troops. Prior
     to that, we'd spent billions bombing charcoal grills the Serbs used
     as decoy tank engines. (Our sensors read hot metal, and bombs
     away!)

     Without boots - and eyes - on the ground, you just blast holes in
     the dirt. Or hit the targets your enemy wants you to strike. That's
     what happened in Qana.

     Anyone who's ever served on a military staff or at the upper
     echelons of government during a crisis can tell you what happened:
     The pressure to obtain results grew ever heavier as it "rolled
     downhill." The prime minister and his Cabinet pressured the
     generals. The generals pressured the staffs. Staff principals
     pressured the intelligence officers and targeting analysts.

     When Israel's version of "shock and awe" failed, Prime Minister
     Ehud Olmert froze like the proverbial deer in the headlights.
     Committed to a model of war that couldn't work, the stunned Israeli
     government insisted on "making" it work. Day after day, the
     pressure increased - until a desperate system dropped its
     safeguards.

     Hezbollah sized up the situation perfectly.

   Part of the problem is indeed the sheer incompetence of Israel's
   political leadership, as Peters touches on in his piece. The scale of
   that incompetence is elaborated upon by Bret Stephens, writing in the
   Opinion Journal (again, hardly a forum known for its liberal slant) :

     ...if it keeps going as it is, Israel is headed for the greatest
     military humiliation in its history. During the Yom Kippur War of
     1973, Israelis were stunned by their early reversals against Egypt
     and Syria, yet they eked out a victory over these two powerfully
     armed, Soviet-backed adversaries in 20 days. The conflict with
     Hezbollah--a 15,000-man militia chiefly armed with World War II-era
     Katyusha rockets--is now in its 21st day. So far, Israel has
     nothing to show for its efforts: no enemy territory gained, no
     enemy leaders killed, no abatement in the missile barrage that has
     sent a million Israelis from their homes and workplaces.

     Generally speaking, wars are lost either militarily or politically.
     Israel is losing both ways. Two weeks ago, Israeli officials
     boasted they had destroyed 50% of Hezbollah's military capabilities
     and needed just 10 to 14 days to finish the job. Two days ago,
     after a record 140 Katyushas landed on Israel, Prime Minister Ehud
     Olmert told visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice he needed
     another 10 to 14 days. When the war began, Israeli officials spoke
     of "breaking" Hezbollah; next of evicting Hezbollah from the border
     area; then of "degrading" Hezbollah's capabilities; now of
     establishing an effective multinational force that can police the
     border. Israel's goals are becoming less ambitious while the time
     it needs to accomplish them is growing longer.

     It is amazing how much can be squandered in the space of three
     weeks. On July 12, Israel sat behind an internationally recognized
     frontier, where it enjoyed a preponderance of military force. It
     had deterrence and legitimacy. Hezbollah's cross-border raid that
     day was widely condemned within Lebanon and among Arab leaders as
     heedless and provocative. Mr. Olmert's decision to respond with
     massive force enjoyed left-to-right political support. He also had
     a green light from the Bush administration, which has reasons of
     its own to want Hezbollah defanged and which assumed the Israelis
     were up to the job.

     But it seems they are not up to the job.

   Michael Totten, no friend of Hizbollah and no foe of Israel, once
   pleaded to [3]leave Beirut alone. All of israel will look back at the
   summer of 2006 and wish they had taken heed. After all, Hizbollah
   itself arose from the last time Israel thought it could influence
   events in the Levant. What botter fruits will the present campaign
   bear down the line? Qana III, most likely... and the cycle continues.

   And what of our own national interest? Given that the United States is
   wedded to the idea of making democracy bloom in the middle east as the
   ultimate answer to the appeal of fanatical islam, one can only
   conclude that our own security has been undermined by Israel's failure
   of will and our own Administrations failure of leadership. [4]With
   Lebanese democracy, hinges the fate of Arab democracy. Iraq has
   [5]noticed, and that's going to bear the biggest bitter fruit of all.

References

   1. http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=YzUyNGNiMzIxOGMzZmJiMmFlODIwNTcxNmFjNTViZDM=
   2. http://www.nypost.com/postopinion/opedcolumnists/the_road_to_qana_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm
   3. http://www.michaeltotten.com/archives/001147.html
   4. http://www.publiuspundit.com/?p=2845
   5. http://americanfootprints.com/drupal/node/2689