[chinawatcher] Nick Borst: Sino-American Relations: The Chinese Perspective

[chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com]

Posted by Nick Borst:
Sino-American Relations: The Chinese Perspective
http://chinawatcher.powerblogs.com/posts/1133561740.shtml


   This is a paper I did this summer for my international relations
   class.
   The relationship between China and the United States has been
   tumultuous since inception, with only brief periods of cooperation.
   Americans have long been drawn to the enormous potential of Chinese
   markets, yet at the same time repulsed by China=E2s repressive political
   system. From the perspective of the Chinese, the relationship has been
   much more traumatic. The supremacy and superiority of the Middle
   Kingdom was toppled by waves of =E2barbarian invaders,=E2 Americans
   included. China has spent much of the last two centuries trying to
   regain the preeminent position it feels it deserves amongst other
   nations. As China begins to fully modernize and unleash its economic
   potential, its relations with the United States are becoming strained.
   With the Soviet Empire in ruins, China is the only nation that is a
   potential strategic competitor to the United States. The primary
   source of friction between the two nations has thus become how a
   rising China will fit into a U.S. dominated international order.
   Surprisingly, following the events of September 11th and the
   subsequent War on Terror, a new relationship of consultation and
   cooperation on key issues has emerged between Beijing and the
   Washington. An examination of the most pressing issues confronting the
   two nations from the Chinese perspective reveals that by cooperating
   on issues of mutual interest and defusing sources of tension, China
   will be able to further its vital interests and avoid a damaging
   conflict with the United States.
   Most pressing are the security issues at hand in the Sino-American
   relationship. American and Chinese interests clash over a wide range
   of security issues including arms proliferation to =E2rogue=E2 regimes,
   Chinese military modernization, and the ever-present Taiwan Strait
   crisis. The Chinese have long found exporting arms overseas
   profitable, both in terms of the monetary benefits and the
   strengthening of relationships with geopolitically strategic recipient
   countries. Beijing and Washington have at some times collaborated in
   providing arms to militant groups, such as the Muhjahdeen in
   Afghanistan, but more often than not the United States has been
   opposed Chinese arm sales (Mann, 2000). The arms sales that are most
   damaging to Sino-American relations are transfers of sensitive missile
   and nuclear technology.
   Initially, China believed that helping friendly nations develop
   nuclear deterrent capabilities would provide a check against American
   and Soviet adventurism in the region, while at the same developing a
   network of alliances with neighboring countries. However, it seems
   that providing this sensitive knowledge has proven to be of
   questionable value to Chinese strategic goals and has engendered much
   American ill will (Odessey, 2005). Chinese assistance to the Pakistani
   nuclear program has led to increased tension in the Subcontinent and
   several incidents of nuclear brinkmanship between India and Pakistan
   (Weiner, 1998). A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would
   create chaos on China=E2s borders and damage its economic interests in
   both those countries. China=E2s assistance to the North Korean nuclear
   program has provided an unpredictable dictator with nuclear capability
   and provoked fear in Japan that led many Japanese to question whether
   Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons (Woodrow, 2005).
   Chinese policy of sensitive arms transfers to allied countries has
   proven over time to be contrary to Chinese interests.
   The Chinese are unlikely to give up their highly profitable small arms
   sales, however, undertaking a policy of being more selective in
   transfers of nuclear and missile technologies would advance Chinese
   interests. The short-term benefits of supplying sensitive nuclear
   technologies to its allies have proven to be vastly outweighed by the
   consequences of provoking China=E2s chief Asian rival to seriously
   contemplate developing nuclear weapons. In order to avoid a nuclear
   Japan and a hostile United States, officials in Beijing are coming to
   see that a change in strategy is needed. Full compliance with
   international nuclear non-proliferation regimes would help dissuade
   the Japanese from developing nuclear weapons and strengthen Beijing=E2s
   relationship with the United States.
   Efforts to modernize China=E2s army are also an increasing cause of
   friction with the United States. American strategists are beginning to
   question whether China will =E2become a =E2peer competitor=E2 or a =E2ne=
ar
   peer competitor=E2 of the United States (Christensen, 2001). The Chinese
   view the modernization of the People=E2s Liberation Army as a natural
   part of China=E2s national quest towards modernization. To the Chinese
   is seems obvious that the strength of its armed forces should rise
   proportionally with growth of the Chinese economy. The Chinese also
   view a strong military as a key part of restoring and protecting
   China=E2s national dignity. Underlying geo-political motivations also
   factor into the quest towards military modernization. There has been a
   tremendous thrust towards =E2developing new coercive options to exert
   more control over Taiwan=E2s diplomatic policies=E2 (Christensen, 2001).
   There is also a push by more hawkish elements in the PLA to modernize
   as rapidly as possible in preparation for what they view as an
   inevitable conflict with the United States. Those in both countries
   that see China as an emerging global competitor to the United States
   grossly misread the situation. The United States military is leaps and
   bounds ahead of the Chinese in terms of technology, funding, and
   tactics, and many experts think that this lead will only increase in
   the decades ahead (Christensen 8). The threat from Beijing comes not
   from military modernization, but from China=E2s geographical proximity
   to American interests in Asia.
   The Chinese military already possess short to medium range missile
   strike capabilities that would allow them to threaten Taiwan, Japan,
   and American fleets and bases in the region, giving China a measure of
   deterrence in dealing with the United States (Lam, 2004). The
   development of new high-tech weapons systems and global force
   projection abilities that are the equivalent of the United States are
   likely futile and won=E2t change the underlying strategic logic of the
   situation (Christensen, 2001). Besides not granting China force
   equivalency with the United States, aggressive modernization could
   damage Chinese interests by sparking an arms race with Japan and the
   United States. As the least economically and technologically advanced
   of the three nations, China would be unable to sustain an arms
   competition indefinitely. Military modernization is a legitimate
   Chinese goal. The PLA cannot possibly be expected to stay backwards
   forever, but too rapid a pace of development would not achieve
   military parity with the United States and would damage Chinese
   interests by sparking a regional arms race. In order to prevent a
   security dilemma from developing in the region, Beijing has done much
   to stress the =E2peaceful rise=E2 of China. The less hawkish elements in
   China are pushing for a more moderate pace of modernization that would
   still achieve Beijing=E2s goal of having a credible deterrent force and
   an eventually result in army worthy of a great power, without sparking
   an anti-china coalition in the region.
   The issue of Taiwan is perhaps the most challenging and dangerous
   issue confronting the Sino-American relationship. The status quo is
   laced with ambiguities and misperceptions, with both China and the
   U.S. making very tenuous assumptions about each other=E2s motives and
   resolve. The history of the conflict traces back to the end of the
   Chinese Civil War which erupted into full-scale war after the
   conclusion of WWII (Cohen, 2000). America, chief supplier of arms to
   Chiang Kai-Shek=E2s nationalist government, became so frustrated with
   Chiang=E2s incompetence that all aid was cut off to his failing regime
   (Cohen, 2000). After a series of decisive communist military victories
   in 1949, the nationalist forces were compelled to retreat to the
   island of Taiwan. American officials decided to leave the island to
   its fate and not interfere when the communists invaded. However, once
   the Chinese entered into the Korean conflict; it became strategically
   and politically unacceptable for any American leader to allow
   communist forces to conquer Taiwan (Cohen, 2000). The American Navy
   was brought into the Taiwan Strait and a defense pact was signed with
   the nationalist government. Two decades followed in which American
   officials clung to the fallacy that the nationalist government in
   Taiwan was still the legitimate government of China. This policy was
   maintained for many years until altered by Richard Nixon during his
   historic trip to China. Desperate to open a dialogue with the Chinese,
   Nixon forfeited several key concessions to China=E2s leaders as a
   prerequisite for beginning talks. The United States renounced Taiwan=E2s
   political independence and endorsed the policy of both Taiwan and the
   mainland being part of =E2one China=E2 (Mann, 2000). Beijing for its part
   agreed to pursue reunification with the Taiwanese through peaceful
   means, but never has completely ruled out the use of force as an
   option.
   After the talks, the Taiwan situation stayed relatively stable,
   occasional flare-ups excluded. A comfortable understanding between the
   Chinese, Americans, and the Taiwanese to preserve that status quo has
   survived. The Taiwanese would refrain from announcing formal
   independence, the Chinese would pursue reunification through peaceful
   means, and the Americans would guarantee Taiwanese security against
   Chinese military aggression. However, recent events in Taiwan have
   begun to challenge the existing status quo. After years of
   dictatorship, Chiang Kai-Shek=E2s son Chiang Ching-kuo began a series of
   reforms aimed at democratizing the government. This process culminated
   in the year 2000 elections where the 50-year Kuomingtang (Nationalist
   Party) majority was broken. Suddenly, pro-independence parties were in
   control of the government (Peng, 2004). The newly elected leaders of
   Taiwan began to eagerly push for a series of referendums that might
   lead to independence. Chinese leaders now became worried that the
   threat of Taiwan declaring complete independence from the mainland was
   a distinct possibility. Allowing Taiwan to declare independence would
   be political suicide for the Communist Party. In the mind of many
   Chinese, Taiwan is a reminder of over 200 years of imperial
   oppression. Taken from the Chinese in 1898 by Japan, the Chinese were
   certain they would reacquire Taiwan after the Japanese were defeated
   in 1946 (Terrill, 2003). When American forces intervened in the early
   50=E2s and prevented the communists from recapturing the island, it
   seemed to many Chinese just another example of outside powers
   interfering with Chinese internal affairs (Cohen, 2000). If the
   Chinese government were to let the island declare independence without
   retaliation, it would be a crushing loss of face for Chinese national
   dignity. For a regime with as tenuous a grip on power as the Chinese
   Communist Party, this could very plausibly lead to their downfall.
   Indeed, so much communist propaganda has gone into convincing China=E2s
   citizenry that the Communist Party will restore China=E2s national
   dignity that China=E2s leaders could not possibly stand idly by while
   the Taiwanese move towards independence (Christensen, 2001).
   What makes the situation even more dangerous is that China might
   misread Taiwanese political moves as an inevitable slide towards
   independence, and therefore act preemptively. Despite China=E2s
   impressive reforms towards military modernization, the balances of
   forces on the Taiwan Strait lie with the Taiwanese and their American
   allies (Christensen, 2001). Taiwan has a capable air force, and
   full-scale conventional war clearly favors the technologically
   superior American forces. However, assured defeat might not be enough
   to deter the Chinese from intervening. The personal stakes are so high
   for China=E2s leaders that they might decide fighting and losing a war
   with the Americans is preferable to suffering the wrath of their
   angered countrymen (Swaine, 2005). China might be tempted to launch an
   unconventional strike against Taiwan before American forces could
   intervene. Presented with a fait accompli of a completed attack, the
   United States would be less eager to become involved in a conflict
   (Christensen, 2001). However, the risks for China associated with an
   invasion are immense. A war with the United States might cause
   catastrophic damage and losses of life, and international outrage over
   an invasion of Taiwan would likely provoke huge economic sanctions
   against China=E2s developing economy. Beijing is faced with two
   unacceptable options. It cannot let Taiwan declare independence, while
   at the same time a war with the United States is too risk prone. In an
   effort to overcome these hurdles, China has recently turned to a
   policy of flexible engagement. Meeting between high-level officials in
   China and the United States have moved the countries closer to an
   understanding of both the specific circumstances under which China
   would attack Taiwan, and the conditions that would provoke the United
   States to defend the island nation. During many of the recent
   political crisis in Taiwan, China has turned to the United States to
   restrain Taiwanese pro-independence forces. At the same time, Beijing
   has used embraced a more conciliatory approach with Taiwan, inviting
   Taiwanese political leaders China on official state visits and moving
   towards closer economic integration with the island. Officials in
   Beijing hope that closer economic ties, good relations, and a clear
   understanding with the United States will eventually pave the way to
   reunification.
   Human rights have become an increasingly important dimension to
   Sino-American relations since the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Before
   the incident, the Chinese government made noninterference in Chinese
   internal affairs a virtual prerequisite before negotiations on any
   other issues could proceed (Mann, 2000). The Chinese insistence of
   absolute control of their domestic affairs is largely rooted in the
   party leadership=E2s insecurity. China=E2s leaders believe that they need
   to be able to employ any and all tools of repression in order to keep
   dissenters at bay. Chinese officials also feel that meddling by
   foreign powers in China=E2s internal affairs is an affront to national
   dignity. When President Nixon reestablished relations with the Chinese
   in the 1970=E2s, human rights issues were not important issues of
   discussion (Mann, 2000). The reestablishment of the relationship was
   based strictly on geo-political calculations and any discussions of
   human rights might obstruct this goal. For strategic reasons, American
   presidents from Richard Nixon to George H.W. Bush consistently chose
   to not place much emphasis on how the Chinese government treated their
   own citizens (Cohen, 2000). Even presidents who were strong proponents
   of human rights, such as Jimmy Carter, had little to say when it came
   to Chinese abuses (Mann, 2000). However after the Tiananmen Square
   incident was broadcast around the world on television, U.S. leaders
   could no longer afford to ignore the issue.
   The incident began after the death of Chinese reformer Hu Yaobang,
   masses of reform minded students begin to gather in central Beijing,
   at Tiananmen Square. When the demonstrators refused to disperse after
   several days, began demanding democratic reforms and erected a mock
   Statue of Liberty, the government decided they could tolerate it no
   longer (Cohen, 2000). Troops forced their way into the square and
   broke up the demonstrations, shooting and trampling hundreds of
   demonstrators in the process. The chaos and brutality of the breakup
   was caught on tape by journalists and broadcast to an outraged
   American public. Immense pressure was put on President Bush to isolate
   and condemn the Chinese government (Mann, 2000). For several years,
   the Chinese regime was cut off from the rest of the world politically
   and economically. The Chinese spent the next several years luring back
   individual nations support with a variety if economic incentives
   (Mann, 2000). By the mid 1990=E2s, the Chinese market had become so
   lucrative that even the Americans could no longer afford to stay
   aloof. The post-Tiananmen policy of annual legislative review of
   China=E2s Most Favored Nation trade status, an important economic
   benefit, was abandoned and soon economic relations between the
   countries were once again booming.
   In recent years, the United States has used a variety of political and
   economic methods to push the Chinese government to implement human
   rights reforms while still expanding the Sino-American economic
   relationship. The United States pressured China to sign the United
   Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Cohen, 2000). American
   support of China=E2s admittance to the World Trade Organization also
   included a variety of stipulations on human rights standards that
   China would have to meet. American based non-governmental
   organizations have utilized public pressure to press for reform in
   China and criticized those dealing with the Chinese regime (Beja,
   2003). Still, the American ability to influence China=E2s treatment of
   its own citizens is limited. Despite the lack of influence, the
   Beijing is becoming increasingly aware of the tremendously detrimental
   effects human rights abuses have on the United States=E2 perception of
   China. America=E2s generally negative image of the Chinese government
   seriously curtails the range and extent of issues on which American
   officials and the Chinese can cooperate on, including issues critical
   to China, like Taiwan and economic cooperation. To counteract this
   China has taken some modest steps towards protecting human rights,
   such as the release of well known political prisoners. A recent push
   to rehabilitate the memory of liberal reformer Hu YaoBang, is the most
   recent example of Beijing=E2s attempts to improve its image in the West.
   Despite these efforts the negative perception still lingers.
   Economics plays a dual sided role in the Sino-American relationship.
   Economic integration links the two economies at the same time economic
   competition pulls them apart. This has resulted in a largely
   unprecedented situation of two nations who are both geo-political
   rivals and close economic partners. From the Chinese perspective,
   rising living standards and economic prosperity are imperative. The
   ideological unity provided by Marxism disappeared when Deng Xiaoping
   decided to move the country towards a free-market economy. =E2Getting
   rich is glorious,=E2 proclaimed loudly by Deng, became a national goal
   and a method of securing support for the regime from the populace
   (Terrill, 2003). To this measure the Chinese government has undertook
   a series of ambitious reforms. Labor markets have been opened up,
   capital restrictions eased, and party leaders have aggressively
   courted foreign investment (Pei, 2001). What has resulted has been a
   decade and a half of economic success and a rapidly increasing
   standard of living. Yet the benefits of economic prosperity have not
   been distributed evenly, and there exists a tremendous income gap
   between the rich urban-dwellers of the coastal cities and those left
   behind in the countryside (Income, 2005). There also remains a danger
   that China=E2s economy could grow too fast, overheating to the point of
   meltdown. Surprisingly, the =E2Marxist=E2 communist party has shown itse=
lf
   rather skillful at tackling these problems which are common to
   capitalist economies. Income leveling programs are being implemented
   to ease the gap between city and rural workers, and a series of
   reforms are being pushed through to gently put the breaks on the
   Chinese economy. However, the party seems rather less skillful at
   managing its economic relations with the U.S.
   Economic ties between China and the United States have been rapidly
   increasing since economic sanctions were lifted in the years following
   the Tiananmen Square Massacre. American companies find a tremendous
   labor pool of low wage industrious workers. Many firms have moved
   their factories to China to take advantage of the cheap labor, and
   increasingly some are building research centers. Jobs with western
   multinationals, such as Microsoft or IBM, are among the most coveted
   positions in China. Domestic Chinese countries have also profited
   greatly from the interaction with America, low-end consumer products
   in America are increasingly produced in China. All this cross-pacific
   economic interaction has inseparably linked the two economies. After
   the Asian Financial crisis took the wind out of China=E2s economic
   sails, it was the economic boom in the United States that helped
   jump-start it again. After the recession following September 11th, it
   was the Chinese economy that acted as a global engine of growth and
   helped boost the lagging Western and Japanese economies. Despite the
   economic gains reaped from cooperation, suspicion still exists on both
   sides. The Chinese government still harbors a lingering resentment of
   the international capitalist economic order and frequently denounces
   it in state run media outlets. The United States is growing
   increasingly wary of the massive trade imbalance between the two
   countries and is concerned over intellectual property abuses (Gomez,
   2005).
   One of the key issues of contention that has emerged is the struggle
   over China=E2s currency. Currently pegged to other currencies, many
   Americans argue that it makes Chinese exports abnormally competitive,
   adding to the large trade deficit between the two countries
   (Fergusson, 2005). The Chinese feel that they are entitled to manage
   their economy in the manner they see fit, and that such currency
   controls are necessary to China=E2s export driven growth. The cloud of
   suspicion most recently appeared when China tried to acquire the
   faltering American oil company Unocal. American officials and
   strategists feared Chinese control of a vital resource such as oil.
   All of these examples illustrate the stark contradictions underlying
   economic interactions between China and the United State. Clearly
   there are many benefits to be had through cooperation, and much to be
   lost from paranoia and obstructionism. China has much to gain from
   unfettered access to the American market, and is desperate for
   American foreign direct investment. Beijing is pressing on with its
   efforts at economic reform, making modest steps towards preventing
   copyright infringement, and currency revaluation. The currency
   alteration may make Chinese exports less competitive, but in return it
   will assist in diversifying the Chinese economy from its reliance on
   manufacturing and help build support in the United States for further
   economic cooperation with China.
   The relationship between China and the United States is a study of
   contradictions. The benefits accruing from cooperation are numerous
   and significant, while the consequences of rivalry are potentially
   catastrophic. The task of accommodating China=E2s rise is a great one,
   but not impossible. China is not a revisionist imperial power in the
   tradition of the Soviet Union or Wehrmacht Germany. The international
   regime constructed by the United States during the last 50 years has a
   place for China; a spot has been there since the order was constructed
   in the closing days of WWII. The United States insisted that the
   Chinese should have permanent membership on the United Nations
   Security Council, even though at that point Chinese government was
   weak and on the verge of collapse. President Roosevelt saw China as
   one of his =E2four policeman,=E2 great nations keeping peace and stabili=
ty
   in their regions in the world. Past generations of American leaders
   knew that China, if not at present, someday would rise to be a great
   power. China may now finally be ready to take its place as one of the
   world=E2s great powers, but it should proceed to do so in a
   non-threatening manner. From its position of relative weakness it
   would do well to ease American apprehensions and elicit American
   goodwill and support. Minor policy changes by China combined with a
   sincere effort to construct a more consultive relationship could lead
   to a mutually supportive and beneficial Sino-American relationship.
   Works Cited
   Beja, Jean-Philippe. "The fly in the ointment? Chinese dissent and
   US-China relations." The Pacific Review os 16 (2003): 439-453.
   Christensen, Thomas J. "Posing Problems without Catching Up."
   International Security os 25 (2001): 5-39.
   Cohen, Warren I. America=E2s Response to China. 4th ed. New York:
   Columbia UP, 2000. 157-231.
   Fergusson, Niall. "Our Currency, Your Problem." Hoover Digest. 2005.
   Hoover Institute. 07 July 2005
   www.hooverdigest.org/052/ferguson.html>.
   Gomez, Berta, and Peggy B. Hu. United States. State Department.
   Intellectual Property Enforcement High on U.S.-China Agenda. 19 May
   2005. 16 July 2005
   usinfo.state.gov/eap/archive/2005/May/19-694355.html>.
   "Income gap in China widens in first quarter." 18 June 2005. China
   Daily. 22 July 2005
   www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/19/content_452636.htm>.
   Lam, Willy. "The End of the Sino-American Honeymoon?" The Jamestown
   Foundation China Brief os 4 (2004): 3-5.
   Mann, James. About Face. New York: Vintage Books, 2000. 5-247.
   Odessey, Bruce. United States. State Department. Chinese Weapons
   Threat a Major U.S. Concern. 02 May 2005. 15 July 2005
   usinfo.state.gov/archive/2005/May/02-538299.html>.
   Pei, Minxin. "Economic Reform and Civic Freedom in China." Economic
   Reform Today. 2001. Center for International Private Enterprise. 14
   July 2005 www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/e14/china-4.htm>.
   Peng, Yuan. "The Taiwan Issue in the Context of New Sino-U.S.
   Strategic Cooperation." Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies.
   2004. The Brookings Institution. 16 July 2005
   www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/yuan2004.htm>.
   Swaine, Michael. "Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China
   Relations." Policy Brief. Feb. 2003. Carnegie Endowment. 07 July 2005
   www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief22.pdf>.
   Terrill, Ross. The New Chinese Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2003.
   206-319.
   Weiner, Tim. "U.S. And China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb." 01 June
   1998. The New York Times. 22 July 2005
   www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bombaid.htm>.
   Woodrow, Thomas. "China Opens Pandora's Nuclear Box." China Brief. 10
   Dec. 2002. The Jamestown Foundation. 22 July 2005
   www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=3D18&&issue_id=3D66=
4>
   .