From chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com Fri Dec 2 17:07:13 2005 From: chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com (chinawatcher@lists.powerblogs.com) Date: Fri Dec 2 17:07:17 2005 Subject: [chinawatcher] Nick Borst: Message-ID: <20051202220713.25CD92A0201@yuuna.powerblogs.com> Posted by Nick Borst: http://chinawatcher.powerblogs.com/posts/1133561227.shtml Napoleon is famously quoted as saying =E2Let China sleep. For when China wakes, it will shake the world.=E2 If one looks at the global energy markets, the world is indeed shuddering as a result of the massive demand for oil by China. China=E2s economy is growing at breathtaking rates and corresponding with this growth is an immense and ever growing demand for oil. In the last decade China has transformed from an oil exporting nation to one of the world's largest importers of oil. As imported oil becomes increasingly critical to the Chinese economy, securing access to energy supplies becomes a national security issue. China=E2s search for oil brings with it many unintended negative consequences. It has led China to form a host of alliances and entangling agreements with unsavory regimes that it otherwise might attempt to disassociate itself with. The quest for access to existing and potential energy supplies has also brought China into conflict with its two greatest rivals, Japan and the United States. If the three powers cannot find a way to accommodate each others energy needs, then the potential for conflict is high. The Chinese economy is undoubtedly one of the most dynamic in the world. China has managed to average double-digit growth rates for over a decade, and consequently China has shifted from an economic backwater to one of the global economy=E2s most important nations. With this unprecedented growth has come a skyrocketing demand for oil. China=E2s =E2oil demand doubled between 1995 and 2005=E2 and demand is expected to increase by =E27.5% per year, seven times faster than the U.S.=E2 (Bustelo 2)(Luft 1). During the 1970=E2s and 1980=E2s, China was =E2East Asia=E2s largest oil exporter,=E2 however during the early ninet= ies it switched to the =E2world=E2s second-largest importer=E2 of oil (Zweig= 1) (Luft 1). More tellingly, last year China =E2accounted for 31 percent of global growth in oil demand=E2 (Zweig 1). Further worrisome is that China=E2s need for natural gases and other energy sources has largely mirrored its demand for oil. These trends =E2have led to deep concern among Chinese leaders regarding their country=E2s energy security=E2 (Bustelo 1). The Chinese government has done little to dampen demand for oil. The energy saving polices of Japan and Europe where =E2steep taxes are imposed to discourage gasoline use=E2 have been ignored (Luft 1). Instead, China has decided to follow the path of the United States in seeking strong alliances with oil rich nations. Creating strong relationships with oil wealthy nations is a harder task than might first appear. China has sought =E2investment and development projects in Canada, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Sudan (not to overlook Iraq), as well as in Russia=E2 (Gardner 2). However due to the geo-political status of many of these countries, China=E2s overtures have brought it into conflict with Japan and the United States. Often this occurs when China seeks ties with a nation that the other two powers (primarily the U.S.) have classified as a =E2rogue=E2 or unfriendly regime. The second situation is when China attempts to build ties with nations that Washington and Tokyo consider within there own sphere of influence. Finally, there are situations where China and one of the other powers (primarily Japan) both claim sovereignty over the same resource. Competition with the United States Faced with competition for energy supplies with the United States, a country that is the world=E2s largest energy consumer and vastly more wealthy and influential world-wide, Beijing has chosen quite logically decided to fill that gaps, seeking ties with nations Washington has shunned. Perhaps the most controversial region that China has attempted to improve its ties with other nations is in the Middle East. China is heavily dependent on the Middle East for its oil with as much as =E245 percent of China=E2s oil imports=E2 estimated to origin= ate from the region (Zweig 3). Worrisome for Chinese leaders, is that this region is also an area where Beijing=E2s influence is modest as best. During the latter half of the 20th Century, the Middle East was a battleground for influence amongst the United States and Russia. With the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent evaporation of Soviet influence in the region, the United States has become the premier power in the region. Lacking the hard power of the United States, Beijing has employed its economic soft power to increase its regional influence and thus gain access to more energy resources. China=E2s main thrust has been towards Iran, a nation that has severely strained relations with the United States. Since the 1979 overthrow of the Shah, the United States has considered Iran to be a security threat and an egregious violator of human rights. China has channeled billions of dollars into to the country through investment projects, such as a $70 billion agreement to develop the massive Yadavaran oil field. Iran has become a critically important supplier to China, supplying nearly =E211 percent of China=E2s oil imports=E2 (Zweig 3). In turn, China has =E2become Iran=E2s top oil export market=E2 (Gundzik 1). China has also explored the possibility of building a pipeline across Iran in order to gain access to the Caspian Sea oil reserves. The issue of greatest concern to the United States is China=E2s refusal to cooperate in efforts to dismantle Iran=E2s nuclear arms program. In a recent agreement regarding energy supplies with Iran, China =E2promised to block any American attempt to refer Iran=E2s nuclear program to the UN Security Council=E2 (Luft 2). If tensions between the U.S. and Iran come to a head, Chinese support of Tehran could lead to a major breach in Sino-American relations. China has also sought to strengthen ties with Saudi Arabia. As the two nations move closer, the relationship is becoming worrying for the United States. Though Saudi Arabia and the United States both profess to have a cooperative relationship, relations have certainly been stronger in the past. The fact that the majority of the September the 11th hijackers were Saudi nationals, in addition to Saudi obstructionism over base usage in the run up to the Iraqi War, has strained ties. Sensing opportunity, China has =E2taken advantage of cooler relations between both the US and Saudi Arabia to launch a diplomatic offensive aimed at developing closer ties with Riyadh=E2 (Bustelo 16), China and Saudi Arabia have also become increasingly close partners in the oil market. Chinese and Saudi petrochemical corporations Sinopec and Saudi Aramco have joined forces to develop refining infrastructure in China (Calabrese 2). Saudi oil giant Saudi Basic Industries Corporation as well has expressed interest in Chinese refining investments (Calabrese 2). Chinese oil companies are also =E2seeking to acquire and expand their footholds in Saudi Arabia=E2 (Calabrese 2). The unelected rulers of Saudi Arabia also welcome China=E2s advocacy of absolute national sovereignty at a time when America is pushing for democratic reforms across the region. Though Beijing is unlikely to replace Washington as Saudi Arabia=E2s chief ally anytime soon, the thought of China moving closer to such a critical exporter of oil is worrisome to the United States. China=E2s endeavors to gain access to energy supplies in the Western Hemisphere have primarily focused on Latin America. China has thrown around its economic weight in order to gain influence in the region (Zweig 3). In 2004 alone, China announced =E2$20 billion dollars in new investments for oil and gas exploration and other projects=E2 in Latin America. An impressive =E240 percent of China=E2s outgoing foreign direct investment went to Latin America=E2 (Zweig 3). One of the specific strategies China has employed in the region has been to strengthen ties with Brazil and Venezuela. Both countries currently have strained relations with Washington, leaving China again with the opportunity to move in the absence of the United States. Brazil=E2s development minister traveled to China to meet with government officials nine times between 2003 and 2004, and energy sales between the nations are increasing (Zweig 3). China recently signed a series of agreements that would =E2allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela=E2 (Luft 2). Though ties with Venezuela and Brazil are strained at present, these countries and the region at large are still enormously important exporters of oil to the United States. A rival power actively strengthening ties in an area that Washington views as its sphere of influence cannot be anything but harmful for Chinese-American relations. Further compounding Washington=E2s fear, a Chinese company is now contracted by the Panamanian government to operate and maintain the Panama Canal, a critical chokepoint for American naval movements and energy distribution. It begs the question as to how strong Washington China to become in Latin America before a 21 st Century version of the Monroe Doctrine comes into play. China=E2s efforts to gain access to energy supplies in Africa also evoke tensions with the United States. China has pursued energy agreements with a variety of African states including =E2the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Libya, Niger, and Sudan=E2 (Zweig 3) Beijing has additionally been =E2working closely with governments in the Gulf of Guinea, from Angola to Nigeria=E2 (Zweig 3). In the last five years, =E2more than 40 agreements have been signed between Beijing and African countries=E2 and trade between China and Africa has =E2doubled to more than $20 billion=E2 (Taylor 4). Despite the tremendous amount of money China funnels into Africa, it =E2turns a blind eye to the way petrodollars are used by the local governments=E2 (Luft 2). China is the =E2world=E2s fifth-largest arms supplier=E2 and many of these arms go to African nations, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, to which other nations refuse to sell (Taylor 5). In Africa, the Chinese government seems consumed by the =E2chase for profits and oil=E2 and is =E2unmoved by ideological concerns=E2 or =E2fear of political consequences=E2 (Taylor = 6). Though Africa is one of the lesser regions of importance to American interests, China=E2s single-minded pursuit of oil there is seen as contrary to many of the human rights and democratization initiatives Washington is pushing. One African nation where tensions between Washington and Beijing have come to a head is Sudan. The Chinese government has =E2deployed thousands of military personnel disguised as oil workers=E2 and =E2provided arms to the Sudanese government=E2 in order to =E2consolidate and protect Chinese investment in Sudan=E2s oil reserves=E2(Luft 2) (Taylor 5).Chinese oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation =E2owns the largest share (i.e. 40 percent) in Sudan=E2s largest oil venture=E2 (Taylor 5). When hostilities between Muslim and Christian villagers broke out in the Darfur region of Sudan, many nations looked to the United States to intervene as it has in so many other parts of the world. Yet as the Americans began to pressure the Sudanese government to end its support of the genocidal Muslim militias, the Chinese not only refused to help, but actively worked towards derailing Washington=E2s efforts. When American diplomats pushed for enforcement of Security Council resolution 1564, a measure that would sanction Sudan for failing to suppress the genocide in Darfur, Beijing declared =E2very clearly that it would veto any bid to impose such sanctions=E2 (Luft 3). Chinese officials have tried to justify their obstructionism as part of their commitment to absolute state sovereignty, but real politik seems a more likely answer. Due to the Sudan=E2s human rights violations, the American government will not purchase oil from the nation, nor provide aid or arms. This creates a tremendous vacuum in which China can gain a stronghold. By providing the support that now other major powers will not, China ensures its access to the vast Sudanese oil reserves. Currently the situation is in a standstill, with a small and ineffective force of African Union troops trying to patrol the vast region. Should the violence escalate to the point where the United States feels forced to intervene, a major rift could open up between the United States and China. This tenuous situation is made all the more dangerous by the fact that Chinese troops are already deployed there. Should the Americans intervene, the Chinese government would have a very stark decision to make as to where its interests lay. Competition with Japan China=E2s efforts to gain energy resources also bring it into conflict with Japan. One country over which tensions are developing between the two nations is Russia. Beijing and Moscow have noticeably been moving closer recently. One very visible example of this rapprochement was the recent joint Sino-Russo war games. For Japan, a nation who is heavily dependent on Russian oil, it is extremely worrisome to see Russia closer ally itself with China, Japan=E2s largest rival. Japan=E2s fears have been further exacerbated by Chinese efforts to gain a larger share of Russian oil. There are ruminations that China is seeking to purchase =E220% of Yukos, the second largest Russian oil company=E2 (Gardner 2). The Japanese and Chinese have recently =E2been involved in a bidding war over a major pipeline deal to deliver Russian oil from Eastern Siberia=E2 (Luft 2). Though Japan won the bidding war, the competition between the two powers helped crystallize in the mind of many Japanese the nature of the growing rivalry between Beijing and Tokyo. As a result of this and several other conflicts, the post-war Japanese government =E2for the first time identified China as a potential security threat=E2 (Gardner 3). As Russia reforms its economy and increases oil production, competition for access to Russian energy reserves will only increase between the Japan and China. Japan and China have also come into conflict with one another in South East Asia, a region Japan views as its sphere of influence. The area is a major hub for oil transport with =E2over 9.5 million barrels of oil per day flow[ing] through the Strait of Malacca=E2 (Pumphrey 245). This is an area that the Chinese claim =E2exclusive sovereignty=E2 over and a= re intensely fearful of a hostile power controlling the sea lanes in this region and thus being able to deny China oil supplies (Lee 24). As a result of this perceived threat, Beijing is strengthening the =E2war fighting capability through military modernization=E2 of its naval forces with the =E2goal of becoming a great sea power=E2 (Lee 24). Many = of these new naval forces are patrolling the South China Sea, farther and farther from China=E2s own borders. As China=E2s naval forces move into the area, the Japanese are bound to watch carefully because as much as =E270% of Japan oil imports pass through the South China Sea=E2 (Mendl 320). Not only are open sea lanes a major concern for Japan, China=E2s aggressive actions towards resources in the area are an anxiety. China has aggressively sought the oil reserves in the Spratly Islands that the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and China all claim rights to. While =E2Japan does not support the territorial claims of any particular country,=E2 Japanese leaders are apprehensive of Chinese intentions (Drifte 61). Incidents like the crisis in the mid-90=E2s when China =E2sent warships to blockade a Vietnamese oil-drilling rig operating in the disputed area=E2 further Japanese fears. (Sardesai155). Tokyo fears that China might attempt to use its power to overwhelm the region and deny Japan access oil there. Not far from the South China Sea, the status of Taiwan=E2s independence also worries the Japanese. The =E2Taiwan strait provides sea-lanes for the importation of 99% of Japan=E2s oil=E2 (Hsu 1005). Should China forcibly assimilate Taiwan, th= is strategic sea lane would be completely under the control of Beijing. Any actions made by the Chinese in these areas, especially expansionary naval moves, will be viewed with intense suspicion by the Japanese. Perhaps the most bitterly contested area between the two nations is the East China Sea. The dispute revolves around Japan=E2s =E2territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and its oil and fishing interests in the East China Sea=E2 (Drifte 48). According to the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, =E2the seabed around the Senaku/Diaoyu Islands is one =E2of the richest oil and gas deposits in the world=E2 (Mendl 79). Most studies have come out in favor of China=E2s claim to the islands, as they are part of the Chinese continental shelf, but hardliners in Japan refuse to cede the islands. Both nations want access to this tremendous source of oil, and so far no agreement has been reached. Tensions over the dispute have been increasing recently with the Japanese air force scrambling =E230 times to turn away Chinese planes approaching=E2 airspace over the East China Sea that Japan claims as its own (Mainichi 1). With China feeling that it is entitled to the area and the Japanese refusing to budge, the situation has become quite dangerous. Provocative moves by both sides, such as drilling and sending in fishing boats, do nothing to help matters. The dispute remains a liability for both nations, and barring a major concession from either side, it is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Conclusion From the perspective of a realist, the possibility for avoidance of conflict over oil looks rather slim. In virtually every region China seeks oil, it comes into conflict with either Japan or the United States. With demand rising, supplies dwindling, and ratios of power between the three nations rapidly changing, the situation appears ripe for an eruption of conflict. One might argue that conflict is not only likely, but inevitable. Surely China=E2s increasing power as compared to Japan in South East Asia will lead the Chinese to push the Japanese out of the region. Later, when China grows strong enough, it is only logical that will also begin to seriously challenge American strategic oil interests. The looming threat of China=E2s future ambitions will persuade Washington and Tokyo to preemptively limit Chinese influence in these regions. China, viewed with the scenario of being cut off from the critical oil supplies its economy requires, will only further its efforts to combat the other power's influence in these regions. Thus from the perspective of a realist, a vicious circle will emerge, spiraling into further tensions between the three nations. There is an alternative to this grim view of assured conflict, and surprisingly the solution has already been in effect for over five decades. The United States must step up and reassure the Chinese that it will continue to play the critical role as guarantor of the free flow of oil to all nations. The reason that there has been such little conflict between the United States and the rest of the world=E2s oil importing nations is due to Washington=E2s three unspoken but demonstrated assurances. The first is that the United States will promote stability in regions that supply oil, thereby assuring that oil production will continue. The second assurance is that the United States will use its naval forces to keep the sea lanes open, thus ensuring the smooth distribution of oil. Finally, Washington has assured the word that it will not use its power to deny oil to other nations. America has for the last half-century through world and deed offered these guarantees. Of course, there have been exceptions to this rule and nations who have been skeptical of America=E2s assurances, but for the most part the rest of the world has acquiesced to American leadership in this role. However, the Chinese have yet to accept these assurances, and until they do so the potential for conflict remains present. Works Cited Bustelo, Pablo. "China and the geopolitics of oil in the Asian pacific region." 9 May 2005. Real Instituto Elcano. 07 Nov. 2005 http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/documentos/226.asp>. Calabrese, John. "Saudi Arabia and China Extend Ties Beyond Oil." China Brief 5 (2005): 1-4. "China, oil and the Risks of Conflict in Asia." The Asianists' Asia. Spring 2005. Research Centre in Asian Studies. 09 Nov. 2005 stateless.freehosting.net/AA4HallGardnerChinaOilConflictinAsia.htm>. Drifte, Reinhard. Japan's Security Relations With China Since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. 61. Gundzik, Jephraim P. "The ties that Bind China, Russia and Iran." Greater China. 4 June 2005. Asia Times Online. 21 Nov. 2005 www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GF04Ad07.html>. Hsu, Immanuel C. The Rise of Modern China. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. 1005. "Japanese fighter jets scrambled 30 times to turn away Chinese planes in last 7 months." Mainichi Daily News. 9 Nov. 2005. MSN News. 20 Nov. 2005 mdn.mainichi-msn.co.jp/national/news/20051109p2a00m0na013000c.html>. Lee, Jae-Hyung. China and the Asia-Pacific Region. Lincoln: IUniverse, 2003. 24. Luft, Gal. "Fueling the dragon: China's race into the oil market." IAGS. Institute for the Analysis of Global Security. 5 Nov. 2005 www.iags.org/china.htm>. Mendl, Wolf. Japan and South East Asia. London: Routledge, 2001. 320. Pumphrey, Carolyn. The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications. Strategic Studies Institute, 2002. 245. Sardesai, D R. Vietnam: Past and Present. Boulder: Westview P, 1998. 155. Taylor, Ian. "Beijing's Arms and Oil Interests in Africa." China Brief 5 (2005): 4-6. Zweig, David, and Bi Jianhai. "China's Global Hunt for Energy." Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 25-38. From chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com Fri Dec 2 17:15:48 2005 From: chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com (chinawatcher@lists.powerblogs.com) Date: Fri Dec 2 17:15:51 2005 Subject: [chinawatcher] Nick Borst: Sino-American Relations: The Chinese Perspective Message-ID: <20051202221548.0DA072A0201@yuuna.powerblogs.com> Posted by Nick Borst: Sino-American Relations: The Chinese Perspective http://chinawatcher.powerblogs.com/posts/1133561740.shtml This is a paper I did this summer for my international relations class. The relationship between China and the United States has been tumultuous since inception, with only brief periods of cooperation. Americans have long been drawn to the enormous potential of Chinese markets, yet at the same time repulsed by China=E2s repressive political system. From the perspective of the Chinese, the relationship has been much more traumatic. The supremacy and superiority of the Middle Kingdom was toppled by waves of =E2barbarian invaders,=E2 Americans included. China has spent much of the last two centuries trying to regain the preeminent position it feels it deserves amongst other nations. As China begins to fully modernize and unleash its economic potential, its relations with the United States are becoming strained. With the Soviet Empire in ruins, China is the only nation that is a potential strategic competitor to the United States. The primary source of friction between the two nations has thus become how a rising China will fit into a U.S. dominated international order. Surprisingly, following the events of September 11th and the subsequent War on Terror, a new relationship of consultation and cooperation on key issues has emerged between Beijing and the Washington. An examination of the most pressing issues confronting the two nations from the Chinese perspective reveals that by cooperating on issues of mutual interest and defusing sources of tension, China will be able to further its vital interests and avoid a damaging conflict with the United States. Most pressing are the security issues at hand in the Sino-American relationship. American and Chinese interests clash over a wide range of security issues including arms proliferation to =E2rogue=E2 regimes, Chinese military modernization, and the ever-present Taiwan Strait crisis. The Chinese have long found exporting arms overseas profitable, both in terms of the monetary benefits and the strengthening of relationships with geopolitically strategic recipient countries. Beijing and Washington have at some times collaborated in providing arms to militant groups, such as the Muhjahdeen in Afghanistan, but more often than not the United States has been opposed Chinese arm sales (Mann, 2000). The arms sales that are most damaging to Sino-American relations are transfers of sensitive missile and nuclear technology. Initially, China believed that helping friendly nations develop nuclear deterrent capabilities would provide a check against American and Soviet adventurism in the region, while at the same developing a network of alliances with neighboring countries. However, it seems that providing this sensitive knowledge has proven to be of questionable value to Chinese strategic goals and has engendered much American ill will (Odessey, 2005). Chinese assistance to the Pakistani nuclear program has led to increased tension in the Subcontinent and several incidents of nuclear brinkmanship between India and Pakistan (Weiner, 1998). A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would create chaos on China=E2s borders and damage its economic interests in both those countries. China=E2s assistance to the North Korean nuclear program has provided an unpredictable dictator with nuclear capability and provoked fear in Japan that led many Japanese to question whether Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons (Woodrow, 2005). Chinese policy of sensitive arms transfers to allied countries has proven over time to be contrary to Chinese interests. The Chinese are unlikely to give up their highly profitable small arms sales, however, undertaking a policy of being more selective in transfers of nuclear and missile technologies would advance Chinese interests. The short-term benefits of supplying sensitive nuclear technologies to its allies have proven to be vastly outweighed by the consequences of provoking China=E2s chief Asian rival to seriously contemplate developing nuclear weapons. In order to avoid a nuclear Japan and a hostile United States, officials in Beijing are coming to see that a change in strategy is needed. Full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation regimes would help dissuade the Japanese from developing nuclear weapons and strengthen Beijing=E2s relationship with the United States. Efforts to modernize China=E2s army are also an increasing cause of friction with the United States. American strategists are beginning to question whether China will =E2become a =E2peer competitor=E2 or a =E2ne= ar peer competitor=E2 of the United States (Christensen, 2001). The Chinese view the modernization of the People=E2s Liberation Army as a natural part of China=E2s national quest towards modernization. To the Chinese is seems obvious that the strength of its armed forces should rise proportionally with growth of the Chinese economy. The Chinese also view a strong military as a key part of restoring and protecting China=E2s national dignity. Underlying geo-political motivations also factor into the quest towards military modernization. There has been a tremendous thrust towards =E2developing new coercive options to exert more control over Taiwan=E2s diplomatic policies=E2 (Christensen, 2001). There is also a push by more hawkish elements in the PLA to modernize as rapidly as possible in preparation for what they view as an inevitable conflict with the United States. Those in both countries that see China as an emerging global competitor to the United States grossly misread the situation. The United States military is leaps and bounds ahead of the Chinese in terms of technology, funding, and tactics, and many experts think that this lead will only increase in the decades ahead (Christensen 8). The threat from Beijing comes not from military modernization, but from China=E2s geographical proximity to American interests in Asia. The Chinese military already possess short to medium range missile strike capabilities that would allow them to threaten Taiwan, Japan, and American fleets and bases in the region, giving China a measure of deterrence in dealing with the United States (Lam, 2004). The development of new high-tech weapons systems and global force projection abilities that are the equivalent of the United States are likely futile and won=E2t change the underlying strategic logic of the situation (Christensen, 2001). Besides not granting China force equivalency with the United States, aggressive modernization could damage Chinese interests by sparking an arms race with Japan and the United States. As the least economically and technologically advanced of the three nations, China would be unable to sustain an arms competition indefinitely. Military modernization is a legitimate Chinese goal. The PLA cannot possibly be expected to stay backwards forever, but too rapid a pace of development would not achieve military parity with the United States and would damage Chinese interests by sparking a regional arms race. In order to prevent a security dilemma from developing in the region, Beijing has done much to stress the =E2peaceful rise=E2 of China. The less hawkish elements in China are pushing for a more moderate pace of modernization that would still achieve Beijing=E2s goal of having a credible deterrent force and an eventually result in army worthy of a great power, without sparking an anti-china coalition in the region. The issue of Taiwan is perhaps the most challenging and dangerous issue confronting the Sino-American relationship. The status quo is laced with ambiguities and misperceptions, with both China and the U.S. making very tenuous assumptions about each other=E2s motives and resolve. The history of the conflict traces back to the end of the Chinese Civil War which erupted into full-scale war after the conclusion of WWII (Cohen, 2000). America, chief supplier of arms to Chiang Kai-Shek=E2s nationalist government, became so frustrated with Chiang=E2s incompetence that all aid was cut off to his failing regime (Cohen, 2000). After a series of decisive communist military victories in 1949, the nationalist forces were compelled to retreat to the island of Taiwan. American officials decided to leave the island to its fate and not interfere when the communists invaded. However, once the Chinese entered into the Korean conflict; it became strategically and politically unacceptable for any American leader to allow communist forces to conquer Taiwan (Cohen, 2000). The American Navy was brought into the Taiwan Strait and a defense pact was signed with the nationalist government. Two decades followed in which American officials clung to the fallacy that the nationalist government in Taiwan was still the legitimate government of China. This policy was maintained for many years until altered by Richard Nixon during his historic trip to China. Desperate to open a dialogue with the Chinese, Nixon forfeited several key concessions to China=E2s leaders as a prerequisite for beginning talks. The United States renounced Taiwan=E2s political independence and endorsed the policy of both Taiwan and the mainland being part of =E2one China=E2 (Mann, 2000). Beijing for its part agreed to pursue reunification with the Taiwanese through peaceful means, but never has completely ruled out the use of force as an option. After the talks, the Taiwan situation stayed relatively stable, occasional flare-ups excluded. A comfortable understanding between the Chinese, Americans, and the Taiwanese to preserve that status quo has survived. The Taiwanese would refrain from announcing formal independence, the Chinese would pursue reunification through peaceful means, and the Americans would guarantee Taiwanese security against Chinese military aggression. However, recent events in Taiwan have begun to challenge the existing status quo. After years of dictatorship, Chiang Kai-Shek=E2s son Chiang Ching-kuo began a series of reforms aimed at democratizing the government. This process culminated in the year 2000 elections where the 50-year Kuomingtang (Nationalist Party) majority was broken. Suddenly, pro-independence parties were in control of the government (Peng, 2004). The newly elected leaders of Taiwan began to eagerly push for a series of referendums that might lead to independence. Chinese leaders now became worried that the threat of Taiwan declaring complete independence from the mainland was a distinct possibility. Allowing Taiwan to declare independence would be political suicide for the Communist Party. In the mind of many Chinese, Taiwan is a reminder of over 200 years of imperial oppression. Taken from the Chinese in 1898 by Japan, the Chinese were certain they would reacquire Taiwan after the Japanese were defeated in 1946 (Terrill, 2003). When American forces intervened in the early 50=E2s and prevented the communists from recapturing the island, it seemed to many Chinese just another example of outside powers interfering with Chinese internal affairs (Cohen, 2000). If the Chinese government were to let the island declare independence without retaliation, it would be a crushing loss of face for Chinese national dignity. For a regime with as tenuous a grip on power as the Chinese Communist Party, this could very plausibly lead to their downfall. Indeed, so much communist propaganda has gone into convincing China=E2s citizenry that the Communist Party will restore China=E2s national dignity that China=E2s leaders could not possibly stand idly by while the Taiwanese move towards independence (Christensen, 2001). What makes the situation even more dangerous is that China might misread Taiwanese political moves as an inevitable slide towards independence, and therefore act preemptively. Despite China=E2s impressive reforms towards military modernization, the balances of forces on the Taiwan Strait lie with the Taiwanese and their American allies (Christensen, 2001). Taiwan has a capable air force, and full-scale conventional war clearly favors the technologically superior American forces. However, assured defeat might not be enough to deter the Chinese from intervening. The personal stakes are so high for China=E2s leaders that they might decide fighting and losing a war with the Americans is preferable to suffering the wrath of their angered countrymen (Swaine, 2005). China might be tempted to launch an unconventional strike against Taiwan before American forces could intervene. Presented with a fait accompli of a completed attack, the United States would be less eager to become involved in a conflict (Christensen, 2001). However, the risks for China associated with an invasion are immense. A war with the United States might cause catastrophic damage and losses of life, and international outrage over an invasion of Taiwan would likely provoke huge economic sanctions against China=E2s developing economy. Beijing is faced with two unacceptable options. It cannot let Taiwan declare independence, while at the same time a war with the United States is too risk prone. In an effort to overcome these hurdles, China has recently turned to a policy of flexible engagement. Meeting between high-level officials in China and the United States have moved the countries closer to an understanding of both the specific circumstances under which China would attack Taiwan, and the conditions that would provoke the United States to defend the island nation. During many of the recent political crisis in Taiwan, China has turned to the United States to restrain Taiwanese pro-independence forces. At the same time, Beijing has used embraced a more conciliatory approach with Taiwan, inviting Taiwanese political leaders China on official state visits and moving towards closer economic integration with the island. Officials in Beijing hope that closer economic ties, good relations, and a clear understanding with the United States will eventually pave the way to reunification. Human rights have become an increasingly important dimension to Sino-American relations since the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Before the incident, the Chinese government made noninterference in Chinese internal affairs a virtual prerequisite before negotiations on any other issues could proceed (Mann, 2000). The Chinese insistence of absolute control of their domestic affairs is largely rooted in the party leadership=E2s insecurity. China=E2s leaders believe that they need to be able to employ any and all tools of repression in order to keep dissenters at bay. Chinese officials also feel that meddling by foreign powers in China=E2s internal affairs is an affront to national dignity. When President Nixon reestablished relations with the Chinese in the 1970=E2s, human rights issues were not important issues of discussion (Mann, 2000). The reestablishment of the relationship was based strictly on geo-political calculations and any discussions of human rights might obstruct this goal. For strategic reasons, American presidents from Richard Nixon to George H.W. Bush consistently chose to not place much emphasis on how the Chinese government treated their own citizens (Cohen, 2000). Even presidents who were strong proponents of human rights, such as Jimmy Carter, had little to say when it came to Chinese abuses (Mann, 2000). However after the Tiananmen Square incident was broadcast around the world on television, U.S. leaders could no longer afford to ignore the issue. The incident began after the death of Chinese reformer Hu Yaobang, masses of reform minded students begin to gather in central Beijing, at Tiananmen Square. When the demonstrators refused to disperse after several days, began demanding democratic reforms and erected a mock Statue of Liberty, the government decided they could tolerate it no longer (Cohen, 2000). Troops forced their way into the square and broke up the demonstrations, shooting and trampling hundreds of demonstrators in the process. The chaos and brutality of the breakup was caught on tape by journalists and broadcast to an outraged American public. Immense pressure was put on President Bush to isolate and condemn the Chinese government (Mann, 2000). For several years, the Chinese regime was cut off from the rest of the world politically and economically. The Chinese spent the next several years luring back individual nations support with a variety if economic incentives (Mann, 2000). By the mid 1990=E2s, the Chinese market had become so lucrative that even the Americans could no longer afford to stay aloof. The post-Tiananmen policy of annual legislative review of China=E2s Most Favored Nation trade status, an important economic benefit, was abandoned and soon economic relations between the countries were once again booming. In recent years, the United States has used a variety of political and economic methods to push the Chinese government to implement human rights reforms while still expanding the Sino-American economic relationship. The United States pressured China to sign the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Cohen, 2000). American support of China=E2s admittance to the World Trade Organization also included a variety of stipulations on human rights standards that China would have to meet. American based non-governmental organizations have utilized public pressure to press for reform in China and criticized those dealing with the Chinese regime (Beja, 2003). Still, the American ability to influence China=E2s treatment of its own citizens is limited. Despite the lack of influence, the Beijing is becoming increasingly aware of the tremendously detrimental effects human rights abuses have on the United States=E2 perception of China. America=E2s generally negative image of the Chinese government seriously curtails the range and extent of issues on which American officials and the Chinese can cooperate on, including issues critical to China, like Taiwan and economic cooperation. To counteract this China has taken some modest steps towards protecting human rights, such as the release of well known political prisoners. A recent push to rehabilitate the memory of liberal reformer Hu YaoBang, is the most recent example of Beijing=E2s attempts to improve its image in the West. Despite these efforts the negative perception still lingers. Economics plays a dual sided role in the Sino-American relationship. Economic integration links the two economies at the same time economic competition pulls them apart. This has resulted in a largely unprecedented situation of two nations who are both geo-political rivals and close economic partners. From the Chinese perspective, rising living standards and economic prosperity are imperative. The ideological unity provided by Marxism disappeared when Deng Xiaoping decided to move the country towards a free-market economy. =E2Getting rich is glorious,=E2 proclaimed loudly by Deng, became a national goal and a method of securing support for the regime from the populace (Terrill, 2003). To this measure the Chinese government has undertook a series of ambitious reforms. Labor markets have been opened up, capital restrictions eased, and party leaders have aggressively courted foreign investment (Pei, 2001). What has resulted has been a decade and a half of economic success and a rapidly increasing standard of living. Yet the benefits of economic prosperity have not been distributed evenly, and there exists a tremendous income gap between the rich urban-dwellers of the coastal cities and those left behind in the countryside (Income, 2005). There also remains a danger that China=E2s economy could grow too fast, overheating to the point of meltdown. Surprisingly, the =E2Marxist=E2 communist party has shown itse= lf rather skillful at tackling these problems which are common to capitalist economies. Income leveling programs are being implemented to ease the gap between city and rural workers, and a series of reforms are being pushed through to gently put the breaks on the Chinese economy. However, the party seems rather less skillful at managing its economic relations with the U.S. Economic ties between China and the United States have been rapidly increasing since economic sanctions were lifted in the years following the Tiananmen Square Massacre. American companies find a tremendous labor pool of low wage industrious workers. Many firms have moved their factories to China to take advantage of the cheap labor, and increasingly some are building research centers. Jobs with western multinationals, such as Microsoft or IBM, are among the most coveted positions in China. Domestic Chinese countries have also profited greatly from the interaction with America, low-end consumer products in America are increasingly produced in China. All this cross-pacific economic interaction has inseparably linked the two economies. After the Asian Financial crisis took the wind out of China=E2s economic sails, it was the economic boom in the United States that helped jump-start it again. After the recession following September 11th, it was the Chinese economy that acted as a global engine of growth and helped boost the lagging Western and Japanese economies. Despite the economic gains reaped from cooperation, suspicion still exists on both sides. The Chinese government still harbors a lingering resentment of the international capitalist economic order and frequently denounces it in state run media outlets. The United States is growing increasingly wary of the massive trade imbalance between the two countries and is concerned over intellectual property abuses (Gomez, 2005). One of the key issues of contention that has emerged is the struggle over China=E2s currency. Currently pegged to other currencies, many Americans argue that it makes Chinese exports abnormally competitive, adding to the large trade deficit between the two countries (Fergusson, 2005). The Chinese feel that they are entitled to manage their economy in the manner they see fit, and that such currency controls are necessary to China=E2s export driven growth. The cloud of suspicion most recently appeared when China tried to acquire the faltering American oil company Unocal. American officials and strategists feared Chinese control of a vital resource such as oil. All of these examples illustrate the stark contradictions underlying economic interactions between China and the United State. Clearly there are many benefits to be had through cooperation, and much to be lost from paranoia and obstructionism. China has much to gain from unfettered access to the American market, and is desperate for American foreign direct investment. Beijing is pressing on with its efforts at economic reform, making modest steps towards preventing copyright infringement, and currency revaluation. The currency alteration may make Chinese exports less competitive, but in return it will assist in diversifying the Chinese economy from its reliance on manufacturing and help build support in the United States for further economic cooperation with China. The relationship between China and the United States is a study of contradictions. The benefits accruing from cooperation are numerous and significant, while the consequences of rivalry are potentially catastrophic. The task of accommodating China=E2s rise is a great one, but not impossible. China is not a revisionist imperial power in the tradition of the Soviet Union or Wehrmacht Germany. The international regime constructed by the United States during the last 50 years has a place for China; a spot has been there since the order was constructed in the closing days of WWII. The United States insisted that the Chinese should have permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council, even though at that point Chinese government was weak and on the verge of collapse. President Roosevelt saw China as one of his =E2four policeman,=E2 great nations keeping peace and stabili= ty in their regions in the world. Past generations of American leaders knew that China, if not at present, someday would rise to be a great power. China may now finally be ready to take its place as one of the world=E2s great powers, but it should proceed to do so in a non-threatening manner. From its position of relative weakness it would do well to ease American apprehensions and elicit American goodwill and support. Minor policy changes by China combined with a sincere effort to construct a more consultive relationship could lead to a mutually supportive and beneficial Sino-American relationship. Works Cited Beja, Jean-Philippe. "The fly in the ointment? Chinese dissent and US-China relations." The Pacific Review os 16 (2003): 439-453. Christensen, Thomas J. "Posing Problems without Catching Up." International Security os 25 (2001): 5-39. Cohen, Warren I. America=E2s Response to China. 4th ed. New York: Columbia UP, 2000. 157-231. Fergusson, Niall. "Our Currency, Your Problem." Hoover Digest. 2005. Hoover Institute. 07 July 2005 www.hooverdigest.org/052/ferguson.html>. Gomez, Berta, and Peggy B. Hu. United States. State Department. Intellectual Property Enforcement High on U.S.-China Agenda. 19 May 2005. 16 July 2005 usinfo.state.gov/eap/archive/2005/May/19-694355.html>. "Income gap in China widens in first quarter." 18 June 2005. China Daily. 22 July 2005 www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/19/content_452636.htm>. Lam, Willy. "The End of the Sino-American Honeymoon?" The Jamestown Foundation China Brief os 4 (2004): 3-5. Mann, James. About Face. New York: Vintage Books, 2000. 5-247. Odessey, Bruce. United States. State Department. Chinese Weapons Threat a Major U.S. Concern. 02 May 2005. 15 July 2005 usinfo.state.gov/archive/2005/May/02-538299.html>. Pei, Minxin. "Economic Reform and Civic Freedom in China." Economic Reform Today. 2001. Center for International Private Enterprise. 14 July 2005 www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/e14/china-4.htm>. Peng, Yuan. "The Taiwan Issue in the Context of New Sino-U.S. Strategic Cooperation." Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. 2004. The Brookings Institution. 16 July 2005 www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/yuan2004.htm>. Swaine, Michael. "Reverse Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations." Policy Brief. Feb. 2003. Carnegie Endowment. 07 July 2005 www.ceip.org/files/pdf/Policybrief22.pdf>. Terrill, Ross. The New Chinese Empire. New York: Basic Books, 2003. 206-319. Weiner, Tim. "U.S. And China Helped Pakistan Build Its Bomb." 01 June 1998. The New York Times. 22 July 2005 www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bombaid.htm>. Woodrow, Thomas. "China Opens Pandora's Nuclear Box." China Brief. 10 Dec. 2002. The Jamestown Foundation. 22 July 2005 www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=3D18&&issue_id=3D66= 4> . From chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com Fri Dec 2 17:21:12 2005 From: chinawatcher at lists.powerblogs.com (chinawatcher@lists.powerblogs.com) Date: Fri Dec 2 17:21:15 2005 Subject: [chinawatcher] Nick Borst: Tiananmen Through A Looking Glass Message-ID: <20051202222112.D2B3B2A0202@yuuna.powerblogs.com> Posted by Nick Borst: Tiananmen Through A Looking Glass http://chinawatcher.powerblogs.com/posts/1133562070.shtml This is a review "The Gates of Heavenly Peace" that I did for my International Relations of East Asia class. ABSTRACT. PBS=E2s documentary, The Gates of Heavenly Peace, examines the events of the Tiananmen Square Demonstration primarily from the viewpoint of the student protestors. In portraying the thoughts and motivations of the demonstrators and a timeline of the events leading up to the massacre, the film does an excellent job. The students are portrayed as idealistic and brave, yet hopelessly disorganized. Unfortunately, the film neglects to detail in any thoroughness the motivations and thoughts of the government or the People=E2s Liberations Army. Nor does the film investigate the reaction of the rest of Chinese society to the massacre. Due to the incomplete view of the even the films presents, it cannot be considered a truly great documentary. Due to these drawbacks, the film is only recommended for those who have a wider knowledge of the film and can put the events presented into a greater context of the whole incident. SUMMARY. The film begins by delving into the history of Tiananmen Square and the critical importance the area has played in Chinese history. The square was the site of the famous May 4th movement in which the first stirrings of a modern Chinese national identity began. After the civil war, the square was the spot where Mao officially declared the People=E2s Republic of China into being. Two decades later, it would be the focal point of Zhou Enlai=E2s funeral and the political movements that it spawned. Finally, we see the square in its most recent form, the venting ground for students who are unhappy with the speed of reform in China. In the mold of the Zhou Enlai funeral protests, mourners have begun to use the death of reformer Hu Yaobang as a cover for criticizing the Communist Party. The protests started small but built in strength. The students were very much disorganized, but managed to put forward a petition for the government to hear. The government refused to acknowledge the students, and this served as a catalyst towards further protests. The students formed independent student unions that acted as the representatives for the movement. Feeling increased pressure, the government issued an editorial in the People=E2s Daily condemning the protests as counter-revolutionary and bent on spreading chaos. The student movement gathered strength as the students adopted more desperate methods, such as hunger strikes. More radical elements took control of the student movements and radical change was advocated over incremental reform. The government agreed to some dialogue, but the results were viewed as unsatisfactory to both sides. As the movement becomes more intense, the reformers within the CCP lose power to the hardliners. The radicals in charge of the student unions refuse to offer concessions or return to their classes. The Chinese government is deeply embarrassed when it must cancel a ceremony it planned in the square for Soviet Premier Michael Gorbachev. Troops attempted to enter the city but were blocked by masses of citizens and workers. On the night of June 3rd, troops again attempted to clear the square and were successful. Skirmishing led to several hundred dead and the student movement in tatters. The government cracked down on any and all forms of descent following the incident and the student movement was largely destroyed in its infancy. REVIEW. The film succeeds admirably in presenting the events from the viewpoint of the students involved. The presentation of the events which is mostly chronological excellently portrays the mounting tensions that lead to the massacre the night of June 3rd. The shift in the composition of the student movement is also clearly shown. There is a visible change in the movement as the demonstrations drag on and tensions rise on each side. The modest efforts at reform initially proposed by the students were discarded by the radicals who gain control of the student unions. The new student leaders proposed radical action and no outcome short of revolution would appease them. The ensuing power struggle between the moderate and radical elements within the student movement is clearly shown. Viewers of the film come away with a nuanced and accurate view of the student demonstrators. If one was seeking a movie specifically about the student perspective during Tiananmen, one would be hard pressed to find better. Unfortunately, the film grasps for more than it can obtain by presenting itself as a near comprehensive view of the events surrounding Tiananmen. The film=E2s website bills it not only as =E2about the protests at Tiananmen in 1989, and the resulting Beijing Massacre of June 4=E2 but also a =E2history of the demonstrations and comments on the =E2deep structure=E2 of political habits and attitudes that have informed public life in China over the past century=E2 (Chang 1). Moreover, the website insists that the =E2filmmakers present a wide range of Chinese perspectives on a defining moment in China's modern history=E2 (Chang 1)=E2 The exploration of the issue from anything of other than the student perspective is severely lacking. The film only interviews one ex-government official and fails to interview a single Chinese citizen or soldier that was uninvolved with the incident as to gage the reaction of Chinese society to the events. The film unendingly hammers away at the theme that a little moderation on the part of the student might have averted the violence, but fails to mention the most glaring reason why the demonstrations failed, the lack of support amongst the Chinese residents. To have any success in effecting real change, the student movement would have to reach out to the citizenry of China and bring them in as allies. While many Chinese felt saddened when the students were gunned down, few gathered arms in protest. In fact, =E2Chinese society fell into a deep anomie after June 4=E2 with =E2people everywhere turned away from politics=E2 (Nathan 48). Some scholars argue that this was the result of an intense crackdown on domestic dissent by the Communist Party, but the reaction was so underwhelming that other forces had to be involved. The real reason rebellion did not spread across China was that the last decade or so has been a time of unprecedented economic advancement. The Chinese were more concerned about the distribution of the new wealth than upheaval of the whole system. The recent rise in their living standards was so dramatic that many were willing to stomach the political oppression in hopes of economic betterment. If The Gates of Heavenly Peace had chosen to showcase these perceptions, the reaction to the massacre becomes much easier to comprehend. Instead, we are left with the nagging question of why the Chinese people did so little to support the student movement and its goals that many clearly shared. The presentation of the government=E2s perspective in the film is also very lacking. The inter-governmental debate on the issue is presented as somewhat limited, with weak reformers quickly losing to powerful hardliners within the CCP. The film ignores that for the CCP to ignore such an outright display of dissent for so long was unprecedented and testified to the extent of the strength of the reformers. The film also neglects to mention that up until the very last days, the Politburo Standing Committee was in favor of negotiating with the demonstrators (Nathan xxvii). Only extra-legal actions taken by Deng Xiaoping =E2in violation of the CCP=E2s own constitution=E2 sealed the violent fate of the demonstrations (Terrill 155). When we examine these developments, the simple presentation of the evil hardliner Li Peng out maneuvering the na=C3=AFve but idealistic Zhao is seen to be a grievous oversimplification. Moreover, it also helps explain the confusion that naturally arises over Deng=E2s actions. The Gates of Heavenly Peace makes great efforts to convince us that Deng signed off on the attacks because he was not =E2completely reformed=E2. The truth is far from it, Deng was relatively unchanging during his reign, embracing only those measures he saw to be practical and beneficial to national strength. All this was subject to one of the key foundations of the CCP=E2s guiding principles, no action will be taken that will weaken the parties grip on power (Kane 48). Deng, viewed in this context is a rational actor focused on maximizing his power rather than a weak-willed quasi-reformer who caved into pressure from hardliners. Finally, we must take into account the fact that so many reformers and student demonstrators are alive to tell their stories is a testament to the relative moderation of the post-massacre crackdown initiated by the government. Unlike incidents such as the Cultural Revolution where few true opposition leaders survived, a myriad of prominent leaders, such as intellectual activist Fang Li-Zhi, associated with Tiananmen are alive and free today. This hollows out the claim of the film that the student movement was shattered beyond repair by the crackdown. These additional perspectives and insights contribute much to a more complex and accurate view of the Chinese government. Another aspect of the Tiananmen incident that was commented on sparingly by the film is the perspective on the military. The Gates of Heavenly Peace correctly portrays the soldiers as being conflicted about participating in any violent actions against the students. However, the film stumbles when it tries to imply that the reservations of the soldiers were due to some support for the causes of the students. This greatly overestimates the level of political involvement of the average solider in the People=E2s Liberation Army. In fact, =E2Deng Xiaoping=E2s political reform, focusing on political rationalization and institutional efficiency=E2 transformed the army from =E2a highly politicized and socially interactive institution into a more professional army=E2 (Zhong 90). The result was that the PLA changed from driving force of political change in China to a tool separate from Chinese society that could be wielded by the CCP for whatever purpose is saw fit. When this new insight on the apolitical nature PLA is considered, we see that the hesitation of the soldiers was mostly likely a result of a reluctance to use violence on Chinese citizens rather than reluctance to oppose those with whom they shared political beliefs. The Gate of Heavenly Peace is not a bad film; it is actually a rather good one if one appreciates it as an effort to represent the views of the student demonstrators and the difficulties they faced. However, if the film is seen as a comprehensive presentation of the Tiananmen incident, it clearly does not measure up to the task. The views of the Chinese citizenry and government officials are only given passing attention, and the motivations of the soldiers are explained incompletely. Without accounting for these critical perspectives, the portrait painted by the film is bound to be incomplete. The film should be praised for what it does well, but it should also be put in a wider context as to not neglect many important elements neglected in the film. The Tiananmen Square Massacre was such an important and complicated event that it deserves to have attention paid to its multi-faceted nature. Works Cited Chang, Nora. The Gates of Heavenly Peace. 1998. Public Broadcasting Corporation. 02 Nov. 2005 www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gate/>. Kane, Thomas. "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy." Comparative Strategy 20 (2001): 45-55. Nathan, Andrew J. The Tiananmen Papers. London: Little, Brown and Company, 2001. xxvii. Nathan, Andrew F. "The Tiananmen Papers." Foreign Affairs 80.1 (2001): 1-48. Terrill, Ross. The New Chinese Empire. New York City: Basic Books, 2003. 155. Zhong, Yang. "The Gun and the Reform: Changes and Continuities in Civil-Military . Relations in the People's Republic of China." Pacific Focus 7 (1992): 89- . 119.