[antimedia] antimedia: Straight skinny from a grunt....
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Sun Jan 20 18:18:12 EST 2008
Posted by antimedia:
Straight skinny from a grunt....
http://www.antimedia.us/posts/1200871086.shtml
....what follows is an analysis from a college-educated grunt - a man
who chose to be an enlisted Marine after graduating from college and
volunteered to go to Iraq and put his life on the line for you and for
me.
I expect that the military and vets among you will nod your heads
throughout. Others, who have never served, may be quickly bored. For
this reason, I've chosen to hide most of the text so as not to force
the entire treatise upon you.
I present it to you without alteration except for some minor
formatting changes and some points upon which I expand after
highlighting. My grateful thanks to my friend, R J Del Vecchio, from
whom I received this information. You'll be happy to know, I'm sure,
that the email is being passed around in the senior levels of DoD.
Let's hope it stimulates discussion that leads to change.
David Goldich Speaks From Iraq
My name is Corporal David Goldich. I graduated from the University
of Virginia in 2004, and armed with a history degree took a job in
Florida negotiating commercial property insurance claims stemming
from Hurricane Charlie. I found success but little pleasure in it
and enlisted in the United States Marine Corps in May 2005.
I am currently assigned to TOW Platoon, 2nd Tank Battalion, whom I
deployed with from April 6 to October 30, 2006 as a Humvee Driver,
Dismount, and Turret Gunner. I deployed again with TOW Platoon
April 20 to November 2, 2007 as a Vehicle Commander, Assistant
Section Leader, and eventually Section Leader. My platoon provided
MSR Security along a well known highway in AO Raleigh, in Anbar
Province Iraq. Our platoon was divided into four sections of four
Humvees (and later MRAPs), each composed of 14-19 Marines plus
corpsman. Between the two deployments I have been on over three
hundred combat patrols, and the issues I discuss below stem largely
from these experiences. I am scheduled to finish my enlistment with
a third tour in the fall of 2008.
---- There has been tremendous change in AO Raleigh (Fallujah) over
the course of and between my 2006 and 2007 deployments. In 2006 my
platoon directly encountered approximately 155 IED emplacements
(found or detonated) over the course of our seven months in
theater. In 2007, tasked with the same mission in the same AO, my
platoon encountered about 15 IED emplacements. The concern of most
Marine grunts headed to Iraq these days is whether or not they will
get their Combat Action Ribbon. I have been told that only about a
quarter of the platoon commanders from a recently returning
infantry battalion that was stationed in AO Raleigh received their
CAR (Combat Action Ribbon).
Although I would not argue that this metric from the officer
perspective is indicative of combat intensity, it is certainly
instructive. Marine grunts are largely getting put to sleep in
Anbar, with interesting unexpected side effects.
Some thoughts.........
([1]show)
Provisional Security Forces (PSF) work! PSF started showing up in
our AO around mid to late may 2007 around one particularly well
known access road off of the MSR we patrolled. They fashioned a
checkpoint and began to check every vehicle coming through. This
example spread quickly and suddenly there were checkpoints popping
up everywhere being manned by locals whose sheiks were
pro-Coalition. More than the language barrier, these men are from
the areas that they police, and therefore know who should and
should not be driving through their checkpoints. They are worth
their weight in gold.
At first PSF checkpoints would be rudimentary, with unshaven men
wearing civilian clothes carrying rusty AK-47's milling about.
Despite their appearance, the PSF managed to eliminate IED culvert
bombs (thousands of pounds of homemade explosive [HME] packed under
the road) completely from their immediate area. We saw the
difference and quickly made it a point to introduce ourselves and
give the PSF concertina wire, glow belts, water, coolers, and just
about anything else we could steal. As the deployment went on, PSF
developed started making checkpoints in conjunction with the IP's
all over the AO, to the point that nearly every major access road
leading to our MSR had a check point. PSF acted as an amazing force
multiplier that denied the enemy freedom of movement in a manner we
could not. Areas in 2006 that were enemy safe havens have been
taken back by the PSF. AQI's presence on the ground is no longer
felt in most areas we operated, either by the Coalition, ISF, PSF,
or Iraqi civilians.
Rules of Engagement/Escalation of Force (ROE/EOF) hinders freedom
of action, is run by lawyers who do not understand the combat
reality on the ground, but is absolutely essential to our COIN
mission in OIF.
I hate ROE and EOF. Every grunt does. Once a month we would have
classes by our platoon commander and a Navy lawyer (a LAWYER!!!)
telling us about different examples of when/what you can or cannot
shoot, what constitutes Hostile Act/Intent, and the necessity of
Positive Identification (PID). The RCT required us to carry a
wallet-sized ROE/EOF card with us on combat patrols at all times,
as if during a firefight I would consult it. The entire program is
run in a somewhat demeaning manner toward the grunt that is
allegedly too stupid to understand what is going on around him. Its
presentation is so flawed that the underlying message is largely
discarded by those whose reality it effects on a day-to-day basis.
This is a shame because restrictive ROE/EOF saves civilian lives,
and the war on the ground in Anbar now is less about killing the
enemy than not screwing up and antagonizing the local population.
We are in a war where an errant warning shot can ricochet and
accidentally kill a sheik's daughter in the backseat of a car with
dire consequences. It is important to show self-restraint. I
remember reading an article by Nate Fick in the Washington Post
along these lines. No one likes having a loaded gun pointed at
them, and if avoiding accidents means I have to present my weapon,
wave a flag, fire a flare, then a warning shot, then a tire shot,
then a grill shot, and finally a kill shot, then so be it. But if
you are going to insist on these rules, than accordingly it should
be explained how in the long run they are actually benefiting that
Marine who in the short term takes increased personal risk in
showing restraint for the sake of the mission. Most Marines that I
know are disdainful of ROE/EOF procedures because this benefit is
not properly described. More importantly the long-term positive
trends of the past year are sometimes difficult to quantify within
the individual Marine's universe. We should be doing a better job
of connecting the dots for those on the ground outside the wire
between extreme self-discipline in a dangerous environment and the
positive developments that such action allows.
Military bureaucracy stifles positive developments and hinders our
capabilities on the ground. When we first arrived in theater this
last deployment, AQI was packing culverts full of thousands of
pounds of explosive, and detonating them as our vehicles drove
over. This happened repeatedly. It took more than a month, several
concussions, a couple of destroyed vehicles, and a security
contractor's right arm before the engineers finally got the go
ahead to weld grates to the culvert openings.
It has always been the nature of the military to be bureaucratic, and,
on many ocassions, that bureaucracy has cost lives. I don't see that
changing any time soon.
At the time we (the sections going out on patrol) kept insisting,
"Why don't we just bury the entrances in dirt?" (The Iraqis won't
let us), "Why don't we put claymores inside?" (A child could get
killed), etc. This problem had to allegedly go all the way up the
MEF ladder before we received permission to weld these grates. In
the meantime I would tighten in my seat as we drove over one of
nearly 50 culverts in our AO almost every day.
Similarly, when PSF started popping up in May, our company level
command (our company commander was on his first deployment to Iraq)
was clueless about PSF. They did not understand the positive effect
they were having on our mission because they did not witness it
day-to-day, only in the abstract academic sense could they
conceivably grasp the enormous change that was happening. We could
not get supplies for the PSF, such as clothing, HESCO barriers,
bulletproof glass, better weapons, food, C-Wire, etc. What we gave
them we stole from base, and probably would have been punished if
caught. These PSF checkpoints were very primitive and vulnerable in
the beginning, and took losses that were unnecessary because they
did not have the support or equipment that very easily could have
been given to them to help. The early lack of cooperation from USMC
toward PSF on the company level probably delayed their influence
and success in certain areas. Also, I don't think it is too much to
explain to the squad leader on the ground that the non-uniformed,
raggedy 20 year-olds wielding AK-47's on the side of a road at a
rudimentary vehicle checkpoint are a part of something, what that
something is, and how it effects us. What I knew about PSF and the
Awakening I got from the (alternative) media, and having the good
fortune of talking to a senior MEF civilian tribal expert early in
my deployment.
The nighttime flare recognition debacle is another instructive
example of administrative malfeasance. Usually at night we would
have our lead gunner identify an oncoming convoy in the opposite
lanes. If Coalition or Iraqi, we would have our lead gunner flash
his Surefire flashlight three times from the turret. Their lead
gunner would do the same, than flash two times, than one. This was
banned by MNF-W rather suddenly, probably for the increasing POG
(Person Other than Grunt) supply convoy blue-on-blue incidents. In
its stead the nighttime flare recognition method was imposed from
above: An oncoming convoy approaches, you halt then fire a red
flare into the sky.
The opposing convoy halts, and fires a green flare into the sky. We
had six-hour patrols on the main east-west highway in the country.
Besides turning every night into the Fourth of July, draining our
pyro resources, and leaving us halted and potentially exposed to
attack, this brilliance let the enemy know our exact position, and
also made red flares (once reserved for dire emergencies) become
the military equivalent of a car alarm that everyone ignores.
Infantry units uniformly ignored the flare guidance and kept doing
the 3-2-1 flash anyway.
It has always been thus. We used to call them REMFs (Rear Echelon
M****r F****rs). Someone behind the lines with lots of authority but
little or no combat experience decides that the troops need to do a, b
or c without any evidence or research to support the utility of it.
Instead they should ask men like Cpl. Goldich what they need.
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)/Force Protection is
counterproductive to COIN ops. The latter is, I think, a now
widely-held view amongst "experts." Excessive PPE not only inhibits
movement, but it sends the wrong message to locals. By excessive, I
mean wearing glasses, gloves, and a face mask at all times. I
understand the justification for wearing these things in certain
situations, but otherwise I ignored it. If you are an Iraqi
civilian, you are already probably intimidated by a Marine wearing
a flak jacket with helmet and rifle. But being able to see my face
humanizes me and makes me more accessible to the civilian on the
street. I would almost never wear gloves and never when shaking a
man's hand or giving a child a high-five. It's insulting to them
and counterproductive. Risk mitigation is necessary but excessive
and rigid PPE guidelines can hurt more than help.
During one patrol in June our section had to stop and turn around
on the same lanes and drive through the oncoming civilian vehicular
traffic that had built up in our wake (we don't allow civilians to
pass in either lane). As the rear vehicle we were providing
security as the section turned around and began come back around. I
got out of my Humvee without my rifle, walked up to the side of the
road, and began to wave the vehicles through in the right lane
(ours were passing by in the left). And as they came up within feet
of me, they honked, waved, smiled, and offered me cigarettes, and I
even got a few rock concert fist pumpings. What they were
applauding, I am sure, was the fact that I felt confident enough in
them to approach weaponless. My gunner had an overwatch position
for me anyway.
When you are going outside the wire every day it is easy to lose
your humanity. The patrol becomes your life and primary if not sole
reason for existing. Events become statistics and every Iraqi
civilian is viewed as a potential threat. Interacting with the
Iraqis and seeing them in a human light that day was the defining
moment of my deployment, and I would like to think that being
treated like people instead of threats left them with a similarly
good feeling.
The best way to stay alive is to think like the enemy. In both
deployments in all my successive billets (Driver, Dismount, Turret
Gunner, Vehicle Commander, and Section Leader) I would play and
encourage others to constantly think, "How would I kill me?" Enemy
TTPs changed gradually to deal with our own changing TTPs, and I
encouraged everyone to literally spend each patrol thinking how we
were vulnerable, and imagine as an insurgent how I would implant an
IED to kill us. How would I use a decoy IED hoax for a sniper shot?
Would a secondary IED emplacement be effective? How about laying a
122 mm shell painted white lengthwise over a white stripe in the
highway at night? Gaming the enemy's probable courses of action
should be at the forefront of every grunt's existence in Iraq. This
kind of thinking is too often neglected by junior Marines whose
seniors do not encourage creative thinking. We were able to dodge
some new IED developments because we had thought about similar
possibilities in advance. Unfortunately too many Marines are dead
from not constantly thinking about the possible threats they face.
Getting shot for standing still outside, having improper geometry
of fires, setting up negligible OP perimeter defenses, having bad
comm. equipment, and not being familiar with geographic specific
IED threats have all killed Marines and will unfortunately continue
because units do not game all the possibilities, however improbable
they might seem.
Reservists are a mixed bag. Infantry reservists are universally
bad, while POG [personnel other than grunt] reservists are much
better than their active-duty counterparts. Marine reservist grunts
hardly ever deploy and possess neither the training nor innate
desire to perform as an active duty grunt. The reservists I know
say it is difficult to take seriously one training weekend a month
when you are at parade rest the other four weeks. Active-duty
affords better training opportunities, and a more realistic idea of
what a deployment environment will feel like. You live and work
with your unit and get to know personality quirks, as well as
individual strengths and weaknesses in a way that periodic,
piecemeal training cannot.
POG reservists such as engineers are fantastic. Their civilian jobs
are usually very closely related to their MOS and they usually
surpass their military counterparts in technique and proficiency.
In the civilian world they have to be good at what they do
otherwise they get fired, sadly an option not available in the
military. It should be.
It often is during wartime. During peacetime, not so much.
SLOW DOWN!!! Our huge bases with a notionally small force require
constant supply by convoy. Gas, food, and other supplies have to be
driven to base from somewhere, and this has to be done every day.
And for some reason, convoys of all sorts insist on driving too
fast. Our section maximum speeds while on patrol were 20-25 mph
during the day and 10-15 mph at night. Especially at night, when
visibility is greatly reduced, driving over 15 mph for any reason
other than a Medevac/Engagement is asinine. Yet every night patrol
I have ever been on (well over a hundred) has been filled with
convoys passing us in the opposite or left/right lanes because
presumably we were driving too slow.
It was our job to move to contact to find the IEDs that kill these
convoys! And they insist on going around us because we are going
too slow! Driving too fast at night is probably the number one
cause of getting hit by IEDs, and the easiest thing to stop. Drive
slower, stay alert, and treat every suspicious curb, piece of
trash, dead dog, whatever as if it were an IED. I would institute a
MNF-W nighttime speed limit of 15/20 mph for most non
time-sensitive convoys, with certain exceptions. I guarantee even
now that lives would be saved at little cost other than annoyance
of having to drive slowly. If a nighttime speed limit had been set
in 2006, dozens and possibly over a hundred Marines would be alive.
Driving slow saves lives.
Blue Force Tracker has the potential to be a great tool but as
employed is nothing more than an expensive toy. All units have
icons that pop up on the Blue Force that move on the rolling map as
they travel (it is updated by satellite every few seconds). Every
convoy leaving the wire should update its Blue Force to state their
radio frequency, full unit name without abbreviations, convoy
commander, number of vehicles and personnel, where they are headed
from and to, what their mission is, and what their status is.
There should also be an RCT/MEF section whose sole purpose is to
evaluate current conditions on the ground and constantly update
Blue Force to reflect on a daily basis. For example, IEDs show up
as a green circle icon, but they stay up for months on the screen
after the event.
Current IEDs should be given one color, and old IEDs or obstacles
should be given different colors based on how old they are.
Furthermore all IED icons should have a detailed description of the
type of round/attack, exact emplacement method and area, what time
of day it was found and by who for contact information. Telling me
that there was an IED/Booby Trap three months ago with no further
information is not very helpful. We need somebody to police what
icons go on the Blue Force to minimize clutter, and the icons we
have should include much more detailed descriptions of events
happening.
This is another example of a theoretical good idea where somebody
throws money at a problem and we get a useless technological mess.
I could have operated a section without Blue Force Tracker the
entire deployment and it would have been 95% the same without any
major hindrance or loss of ability. That is a shame and a waste.
Lack of user feedback to update the software is keeping this
possibly invaluable tool from reaching its potential. Technology is
the domain of the young and I bet if you put three 19 year-old
lance corporal technogeeks in charge of revamping Blue Force
Tracker the system could be overhauled in about a month for the
better.
JERRV/MRAPs [mine resistant ambush protected vehicle] are
advantageous but nowhere near as useful as the initial hype. I
understand why USMC has backed off their initial plan to completely
replace the Humvee with MRAPs. It just is not practical. The
vehicles are monstrous and provide excellent protection/comfort at
the expense of visibility and mobility. EOD and route clearance
units have been using MRAPs for a while now, but 2007 marked their
first widespread use among regular units. My section actually went
on the first MRAP non-EOD patrol for MNF-W. Murphy's Law went into
effect as to be expected; one of the MRAPs broke down and had to be
towed back to base.
Once the kinks were worked out it became obvious that MRAPs
provided protection against the most dangerous threats in the AO at
the time: Huge SVBIED's and the aforementioned culvert bombs. If
you wanted to check out a possible IED on the side of the road you
could literally just drive up to it and peer out the window. If
traveling down a dirt road, a convoy could place an MRAP as lead
vehicle and thus virtually eliminate the threat of buried pressure
plates on the rest of the convoy. The vehicles are relatively quick
considering their size, have great creature comforts, and the class
III large variants we had have seating for eight plus one gunner in
the turret. If need be in a pinch I could easily fit a squad and
probably in a dire emergency around two dozen Marines with full
gear inside. I would recommend modifying the class III as a
convertible medical vehicle; one large MRAP could fit up to four
litters while having two corpsmen provide medical care without
interfering with operation of the vehicle at all.
MRAPs are not without severe limitations. The largest variant
weighs 40,000 lbs. During the summer dry months, and on a paved
MSR, we had little problems. However during the winter rainy
season, it remains to be seen how well these tremendously heavy
vehicles can trudge along through the mud without getting stuck,
leading to the next problem. An MRAP cannot be towed by another
MRAP, you have to call Regiment and get the engineers out with a
wrecker to tow it once stuck. This is immensely time consuming and
leaves the crew/convoy potentially vulnerable. If a Humvee breaks
down outside the wire, you can hook it up to another Humvee with
chains, a tow bar, tow strap, etc. The hooking up and towing
process should take less than a minute or so when time is of the
essence. Waiting for the engineers to come tow your MRAP can take
hours. What is the expected number of MRAPs to break down per day
and how long will the average wait time be in the future? I
envision these vehicles getting stuck in the mud all the time and
having maintenance issues once they have had some serious miles put
on them.
Furthermore, MRAPs can simply not travel down certain dirt roads
that are too narrow or too unimproved. Once our platoon moved to
half MRAP vehicles it became evident that we simply did not need a
100% MRAP force. Having two Humvees mixed with two MRAPs in a four
vehicle section allowed us to negate the IED threat while still
maintaining mobility. I was told by an officer allegedly in the
know that the original plan was to replace almost 90%+ of RCT-6
Humvees with MRAPs by the end of 2007, and I'm glad to see that the
MRAP full replacement policy has stalled in light of the decreased
violence in the province, in addition to the issues mentioned
above.
M4's are great weapons, however at much past 400-500 yards their
shorter barrel becomes a hindrance. I have experienced this
firsthand in Iraq, and more recently at my latest rifle range last
week at the 500 yard line (needless to say I still shot expert).
All turret gunners should be equipped with A4's, and definitely I
would not want a squad with all M4's for the exact same reason.
In Iraq pistols have become a vanity weapon for Officers and Staff
NCO's. If we are going to have pistols at all, which is a whole
other question, I recommend going back to the .45. A 9mm bullet is
even less effective than the 5.56. But really, why are pistols
being issued at all? I can see pistols being effective in close
quarters battle in an urban environment, but this is not being done
by the Officers and SNCO's who are the ones primarily being issued
these things in the first place! I really have no problem with
senior officers being issued a pistol for practical reasons, but I
will say that when the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps spoke at
Camp Fallujah he was carrying an M4 not a pistol, and he did so the
entire time he was at base. If we are going to issue pistols at
all, make them .45 caliber, give them to the squads going out on
patrol who might conceivably use them, and make junior officers lug
around all seven lbs. of their M4 around base.
The 5.56 round is not effective against insurgents who are doped
up. My section has slugged it out with insurgents who were as
fearless as their methamphetamine pills made them. Increasingly
AQI/insurgents will get all doped up on whatever pain
relievers/narcotics are available, and then go out in a blaze of
glory. Some light was made about the ineffective nature of the 5.56
during the siege of Fallujah and how units were picking up
discarded AK-47s for that little extra oomph. The same problem is
true today. Its hard to believe that a human being can get shot 5
or 6 times and keep on ticking, but I have had seen it happen one
too many times to remain blind to the fact that the 5.56 is simply
too weak a caliber against a drugged out enemy. The 7.62 bullet
will blow the barnyard door out of the back of an insurgent's
chest, but for the grunt on the ground the problem of increased
weight/reduced ammo capacity remains. I would argue that we should
be looking at the 6.88 caliber round for M16 variants, which I
believe the Aussies have used with great success. It's a good
compromise between weight and stopping power. I am not arguing for
automatic weapons at all; I have never used the burst setting on my
M4.
I just think that our enemies in the near future will continue to
be irregular and use every advantage possible, such as narcotics.
Drugged out insurgents/terrorists/paramilitaries are the wave of
the future that we will be facing and our primary rifle caliber
should be able to tackle them and reflect this reality.
From experience, I would mandate that every Marine outside the wire
should have a 10 magazine load at all times. Every grunt unit
develops their SOP for what they should be carrying outside the
wire, and the standard issue is 7 magazines, this obviously lessens
or increases with each unit and what particular patrol is being
conducted. I carried a minimum of 12 magazines at all times on my
person, and at one point was even carrying 18. This is a bit
excessive in the abstract, but I had definite reasons at the time
borne out by experience for doing so.
The MK-19 is the make or break weapon of the CAAT/MAP
section/convoy. It is the most intricate crew-served weapon in our
arsenal, the most likely to not function in combat, and the most
devastating if employed. The MK-19 should be manned by the most
senior gunner, and I would even have an otherwise experienced
vehicle commander as the MK-19 gunner just so I know that it would
be ready when necessary. This weapon constantly malfunctioned
outside the wire during situations where its presence would have
ended events rather quickly.
I would like to bring back the M-79 Vietnam Era Thumpers. The MGL
(A revolver-like 6-shot 40MM weapon) is a nice tool but a little
too bulky to carry around in addition to your regular weapon. You
still see Special Forces carrying old M-79's around and senior fire
team and squad leaders have M203's, but the M203 lacks the speed,
portability, and easy aiming of an M79.
All Humvee turret gunners should have a SAW as a secondary rifle in
case their primary weapon goes down. Ideally it should be already
side-mounted (this is what I had last year as .50 cal gunner) but a
lot of the newer turrets render this nearly impossible.
Automated turrets are a bad idea. The video recognition system is
apparently good and the aiming system works fine, but nothing can
replace having a human being in the turret. A turret gunner can
hear where a gunshot is coming from, smell leaking gasoline from a
fuel tank that has been sniped, and most importantly feel the
situation as it develops. As a turret gunner there were times that
I just felt something wrong and was able to anticipate what
happened next.
The larger point about automated turrets, Blue Force Trackers,
MRAPs, etc. is that technology is not a panacea. All the
technological advances in the world will not prevent poorly trained
personnel from killing themselves and others. My Humvee had a
Chameleon CREW anti-IED device for the non-existent RCIED threat
that we would regularly not use because it completely ruined our
radio communications. We also had a Blue Force Tracker that
provided virtually 0% strategic capability. I had a Boomerang audio
sensor that could track what direction and how far away a sniper
shot was coming from that was used sparingly and that any good
turret gunner could emulate. Finally, I had a video camera with
zoom function that could extend to a height of about 20/25 feet for
monitoring...something---I never put it to good use. This is
hundreds of thousands of dollars of useless technology. I would
rather have the USMC spend that money developing better trained
Marines who understand how to think for themselves in a rapidly
changing environment. Or maybe raise salaries to entice better
people to think about enlisting. I am aware of no technology or
combination of technologies that can on the whole replace a quality
man on the ground. I would rather minimally augment the
well-trained grunt with some gadgetry than completely submerse the
poorly trained grunt with the latest technologies.
We have no lightweight fast infantry anymore. Here is another
situation where technology has improved our casualty situation at
the extreme expense of our killing ability. Thousands of troops are
alive because of their flak jacket and body armor, but how many
more thousands of enemy are alive because the Marine wearing 50+
lbs or armor could not chase the insurgent more than 500 yards
without having a heart attack?
I consider myself in pretty good shape, but having a flak jacket
with ESAPI armor plates, side SAPI plates, a Kevlar helmet, a
standard magazine load, and rifle is very cumbersome. I could not
conceivably chase down a determined insurgent who wanted to run
away over any appreciable distance. The body armor situation I
think represents a microcosm of larger trends happening in society
and/about the military. Our society has placed so much emphasis on
protecting the troops that our military has acceded to it. My job
is to defeat the enemy, not protect myself.
Although I have no way of proving it, I am willing to bet that if
we had adopted a lighter weight form of body armor (even at the
expense of protection), increased mobility would have offset
increased casualties with the killing of more enemy. When you fail
to kill the sniper because you cannot run his position down, he
returns to kill more of your friends the next week. When you fail
to kill the AQI cell leader because you cannot climb over a wall in
your body armor, he lives to organize a SVBIED that detonates on
your friends along an MSR several days later. Our sense of force
protection projected from the top-down is so misguided and
permeates every aspect of our training, fighting, and mission. It
disgusts me. I accept that I am expendable so why can't everyone
else?
I have before argued that one of the purposes of our military is to
die in our stead. Every man who faces combat knows that could be his
fate. The public needs to understand and accept that. The cost of war
is lives.
We therefore should not go to war without understanding that cost, nor
should we dishonor their willing sacrifices by attempting to achieve
political gain at their expense.
All units need to coordinate movement on the ground better. Every
convoy traveling anywhere should submit an online itinerary of
pertinent details that should be forwarded to every command through
which they will be traveling, and this information should be
forwarded through radio or Blue Force to the boots on the ground.
It will save a lot of confusion and more than a few lives. These
convoy lead vehicles should always be a MRAP or a Humvee with
rollers.
Every Marine should know how to operate a .240 medium machine gun.
This needs to become an annual training requirement immediately. It
is the crew-served weapon of choice for turret gunners and, being
essentially a 7.62 SAW, the easiest to use.
Company Commanders in Anbar are largely dictating on the ground
policy just in the same way that first term Corporals are
implementing it on a day-to-day basis. This is a huge departure
from the past. I remember reading Michael Yon's suggestion for
aspiring journalists coming to Iraq: Talk to the battalion
commanders to find out what is going on in their battle space on
the ground. His reasoning was that in Iraq the fighting has
devolved so far down that it is no longer a division or regimental
fight but a battalion fight, and therefore the Battalion Commander
in charge of his AO is most likely to know the most about the area
and situation and give the most frank assessment. I would take this
one step further, at least in regards to Anbar, and argue that the
infantry Company Commander (Captain) has widely become the most
important rank/billet in Iraq. Company Commanders in AO Raleigh
have their own personal fiefdoms and control entire suburbs of
Fallujah. They are responsible for organizing local ISF and
coordinating civil projects in addition to maintaining security.
There are too many troops in Anbar right now. AO Raleigh is the
most dangerous AO in Anbar, and is immeasurably better than in
2006. Ramadi has been pacified to the point that Camp Ramadi, I
have been told, is a saluting FOB. Saqliwiyah, Zaidon, and even to
some extent Karma (AO Raleigh suburbs of Fallujah) have been
largely pacified. I am not a policy expert, but by the time we left
in November 2007, virtually every grunt unit I talked to saw
boredom as their primary adversary. It seems to me that we could
draw down significantly in Anbar in probably every AO with little
effect on the security situation. Marines could be better used
elsewhere.
On the other side of the coin, we have too many support troops
doing absolutely nothing in Iraq. There was an article in the
Marine Corps Times about how the average Marine now gains 10 lbs in
Iraq and their cholesterol shoots up tremendously. I found this
funny, as I lost 25 lbs. in 2006 and 15 lbs. in 2007. This weight
loss is typical of most other grunts I worked with. The weight
gain, however, is coming from support troops who are staying on
base living a sedentary lifestyle and doing not much at all. There
are ways we can trim the fat of our total force in Iraq without
suffering any ill effects by eliminating these support troops who
are doing nothing. Walking around Camp Fallujah or any main FOB
will open one's eyes to the excess personnel we have in Iraq.
Similarly, I see little point in transforming the USMC from 180,000
to 203,000 troops unless the bulk of those troops are combat arms.
As is we are only adding essentially one regiment of grunts, and
these are the troops who are overworked and over-deployed. We need
more grunts!!!
I hope that our thinkers at the Pentagon are putting some effort into
this. We need to find a way to maximize effectiveness by streamlining
supply efforts and increasing combat brigades.
The amount of violence in Anbar is indirectly proportional to the
level of garrison nonsense imposed by higher. In 2006, Anbar was
very violent. Accordingly, my platoon stationed aboard Camp
Fallujah (one of very few infantry units stationed on base) issued
ourselves the moral authority to ignore whatever BS was coming from
the top about petty issues. If someone (read: POG SNCO) decided to
"hawk" one of us for not having a haircut or some equal nonsense,
you could pretty much get away with telling him what you did that
day on patrol and asking him when the last time he went outside the
wire was. (My personal favorite riposte was asking them how many
bodies they had on their pistol, that always shut them up real
good.)
In 2007, because of the perceived and real drop in violence, more
and more stupid rules and garrison "stuff" seeped into life on
base. For support troops this is of minimal importance, their life
in Iraq is largely the same as back in the US. But having the
Headquarters Battalion Sergeant Major tell me how to properly clear
my weapon upon my return from a patrol in which I faced
considerably more danger than the errant paper cut is more than
demoralizing. It is sad. The joke is that CF is actually called
Camp Flejeune. When I talk to Marines about redeploying, the
biggest worry is not about the enemy but how stupid the garrison
mentality will be when we return. There is something wrong with
that picture. The notion that current luxuries afforded troops in
Iraq is somehow different from past wars is wrong. Occasionally I
read about how the troops in Iraq have too many luxuries, how great
our food is, how we have internet, etc. The tone of these comments
is generally disdainful, and suggestive that we could minimize our
convoys and exposure if we would just live a more Spartan
lifestyle. I readily concede that we have great food and internet
access in Iraq, both luxuries unavailable in say, Vietnam. Of
course we do not have cold beer, women , and big time celebrities
on the USO tour. Imagine going 7 months without a cold beer or
companionship. It is not fun. Every war is different, but they are
universal in their misery. I would ask veterans of past wars to cut
current troops some slack on this account.
Besides, largely these luxury benefits are least available to those
who deserve them most, those who are stationed (like we often were
for weeks at a time) at Observation Posts and Firm Bases scattered
throughout the AO. This, as I have been told, is unchanged from
past wars.
Kids uniformly love the troops. We shower them with candy, cold
water, and toys, and have secured their loyalty. Beyond the
superficial, kids are going to new schools, playing outside, and
often receiving coalition medical outreach care. They will remember
it. Like most Arab countries, Iraq is young, and the children of
today will be the leaders of the next generation. On this subject,
we got it right from the beginning. The most positive reactions I
got on patrol were inevitable from children of all ages and both
genders.
Negative comments from politicians played over television have a
dramatic effect on morale, especially on troops who are otherwise
indifferent and disdainful of politics in general. I cannot tell
you how many times I have overheard Marines and soldiers talking
about various inconsiderate comments made from the likes of John
Kerry, Murtha, Reid, and Pelosi about how we cannot win, how we
should be brought home, etc. The Kerry comments really cemented his
reputation with the troops and upset people more than anything
else. It is unnerving to volunteer for service during wartime
hoping to be deployed and having to listen to a politician explain
how the troops need to come home, especially when we clearly have
not finished what we started.
This needs to be read by every politican in our government. Once
you've committed troops to the fight, you need to see it through to
the end. You need to temper your language, especially when mentioning
our troops, and consider that our troops hear everything you say.
There is a widespread perception amongst the Marines I know, even
those uninterested in politics, that the Democratic Party does not
want us to win in Iraq for whatever reason. This is true even
amongst Democrats who still maintain the party viewpoint on almost
every other issue but the war. Morale is always a tricky issue to
deal with, and it is difficult to tell a Marine to buck up when he
sees important people back home undercutting his primary reason for
existing at the moment.
The news cycle in the mainstream media is about 4/6 months behind
events on the ground. The evolution of the IED threat is a perfect
example. I remember seeing an article in the Marine Corps Times
about a new "speed bump" IED appearing in Iraq. This was about 6
months after we first encountered them. Likewise there was an
article in the Washington Post/MSNBC about pressure plate IEDs
several months ago that made it seem like this threat, which had
been around for over a year, was somehow new. The same thing is
true with the effects of the surge.
This is an amazing comment in this modern age. With instantaneous
communications worldwide, how can the media be so far behind the
curve?
Perhaps this explains the tremendous popularity of milbloggers.
The most accurate news reporting on the ground in Iraq is coming
from bloggers and the alternative media. When I was in Iraq I would
read Michael Yon and Michael Totten when possible for great stories
on what was really happening elsewhere around the country.
Every returning unit from Iraq should be given uncharged "basket"
leave for post-deployment. Even if you have to offset the cost by
taking out money of the paycheck elsewhere, this would have a huge
positive effect on morale. I earn 30 days of leave per year and
between pre- deployment and post-deployment leave in 2006 and 2007
there is none left should I so desire to take some time off. My
unit is an extreme example with back-to-back-to-back deployments,
but this problem exists everywhere. Marines are burned out and
should be able to spend 20 days with their families when they
return home from Iraq, regardless of their MOS.
The Iraqi Army (IA) and Iraqi Police (IP) in Anbar are tremendously
better than they were in 2006. The IPs in particular are much
better in AO Raleigh. In 2006 they were infiltrated by insurgents
and AQI and could not be trusted. The ones that could be trusted
were afraid to leave their bases and do any policing, which to be
fair essentially amounted to military style patrolling. The IP's
are now out on the streets, proud and unafraid. They look more
professional! , have better weapons and vehicles to include flak
jackets, interact with a grateful population that respects them
(the old Saddam-era civilian disdain toward police officers has
evaporated), and will not back down from a fight. In the city of
Fallujah, the IP's are largely running the security show and the US
presence has been reduced to MITT/PTT teams and essentially one
company of grunts. They more and more act and gradually look like a
professional force, largely because they are becoming one. IP's
maintain an overwatch p position in front of the main exit of CF
and guard the most important bridge in Anbar for coalition convoy
traffic. These jobs could not have been provided in 2006, and I
would have laughed should someone have suggested them. My 2007
deployment was in many ways emasculating because of increased ISF
presence, and I could not be happier.
The weakest link in the USMC right now is the Staff NCO. Most
joined before 9/11, and do not share the post 9/11 enlistee's
motivation to enlist: knowing he will probably be going to war.
Many if not most are stuck in a garrison mindset of the late 1990s:
Med-Floats and West-Pacs which hold little meaning now with Iraq at
the forefront. The strategic first-term corporal/sergeant is in
charge on the ground. He made his bones in Iraq not stateside at a
training evolution. You cannot teach an old dog new tricks and the
current lot of staff sergeants, gunnery sergeants, and even some
first sergeants are stuck in a peacetime mindset. Over the next two
years many of the first crop of post-9/11 re-enlistees will be
picking up Staff Sergeant and things will slowly change for the
better. Some examples I have experienced would be comical if
peopleâs lives weren't at stake. Maybe my viewpoint is radically
different than others. But the trend of inadequate SNCOs seems to
permeate the ranks of combat arms amongst almost every unit I have
become acquainted with. Rank is not an indication of talent, and
many senior Marines, both enlisted and officer, have confused the
two.
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References
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2. file://localhost/var/www/powerblogs/antimedia/posts/1200871086.html
3. http://technorati.com/tag/Iraq
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