[antimedia] antimedia: Waiting for the other shoe to drop

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Posted by antimedia:
Waiting for the other shoe to drop
http://www.antimedia.us/posts/1153976802.shtml


   This is part three of the Dave Gaubatz story. ([1]Part 1 reveals
   Dave's background and his sterling qualifications for the work he was
   tasked to do in Iraq. [2]Part 2 covers the period of time he spent
   gathering intelligence data in Iraq and the stunning evidence of new
   WMD and banned missiles that he found while there.)
   Before addressing the issue of why Dave's intelligence efforts have
   never been exploited, I need to cover a couple of details about the
   WMD that I didn't mention in part 2.
   First, the information Dave uncovered indicates that the WMD stored in
   the four bunkers were new weapons produced post-1991 Gulf War. Readers
   will recall that one of [3]Saddam's sons-in-law revealed, in 1995, the
   extent of Saddam's weapons stores, which triggered his assassination
   months later at the hands of Saddam's goons.
   I disagree with detractors regarding the attestation of Kamel that
   "after the Gulf War, Iraq destroyed all its chemical and biological
   weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver them". If that were true,
   UNSCOM would not have [4]still been finding weapons as late as 1997,
   shortly before Saddam kicked them out of the country. Furthermore,
   Kamel would not have been [5]discussing with Saddam how they hid the
   weapons programs from inspectors mere months before he defected and
   was debriefed by UN inspectors. Finally, US forces would not still be
   finding [6]hundreds of pre-1991 chemical weapons if they were all
   destroyed as Kamel stated. Kamel's statement about the destruction of
   all weapons cannot be considered factual or reliable.
   Second, at one of the sites that Dave inspected (he was able to view
   each of the sites but could not enter the bunkers because they are
   under water and require heavy equipment to investigate), he found
   evidence of an [7]al Samoud missile. Al Samoud missiles were [8]banned
   under the UN resolutions because of their longer range capabilities as
   well as their ability to deliver WMD.
   In July, 2003, after uncovering credible evidence of WMD storage
   bunkers in southern Iraq, Dave returned to the United States. In his
   short stay in Iraq, Dave had produced 36 IIRs including information
   about WMD in sourthern Iraq, Russian and Iranian intelligence
   activities in Iraq, Russian assistance in hiding WMD in Iraq and the
   presence of both Hezbollah and Al Qaeda terrorists who were attacking
   US forces.

     While in Iraq I had identified (with other Federal Agents) four
     sites that were highly suspected of containing biological and/or
     chemical weapons. The sites were identified by very credible Iraqis
     who had knowledge and access to the areas. They risked their lives
     to provide intelligence about the sites and to take U.S. personnel
     to the locations. The sites would require heavy equipment to
     exploit the sites. The material was alleged to be buried deep and
     under water. To this date the sites have not been inspected.

   Why have these sites not been investigated? The story of the failure
   to inspect the sites reads like a comedy of errors.
   From April through June of 2003, while Gaubatz was still in Iraq, he
   and his fellow agents made numerous attempts to get the Iraq Survey
   Group to inspect the sites. None of these attempts were successful.
   The Survey Group, and all American forces, had moved on. The action
   was in northern and central Iraq, and southern Iraq was left to the
   British to maintain order. In the [9]ISG's final report they admit
   that they focused their limited efforts on sites that had been
   identified as potential WMD storage sites and only inspected some
   "10%" of the sites they were tasked to inspect. The four bunkers in
   southern Iraq were not on that list.

     ISG began its search for Iraqi chemical weapons by identifying a
     set of facilities from the nearly 1,000 sites at which Iraq
     stockpiled or deployed munitions. ISG obtained from CENTCOM a
     database of 104 ASPs identified within the assessed âRed Lineâ
     surrounding Baghdad (see Annex G, for details on the âRed Line
     Theoryâ). This list was narrowed down to 26 sites using two main
     criteria (see Figure 6).
     * Reporting of a suspect CW decontamination vehicle, a âSamarraâ â
     type water truck in proximity to the ASPâat the time the targets
     were selected, the presence of these vehicles was regarded as
     indicators of CW-related activity.
     * An artillery unit capable of firing 122mm multiple-rocket
     launcher (MRL) or 155mm CW rounds, also in proximity of the site.
     The ASPs of the Republican Guard Al Madinah, Al Manawrah, Baghdad,
     and Hammurabi Divisions were of highest priority because of the
     unitsâ trusted status and location during the combat phase of OIF.
     Exploitation of the 26 ASPs began with a thorough review of all
     reporting the facilities to discern the status and change in the
     site during and after OIF , in order to narrow the list of sites to
     be visited.
     * Reporting revealed 16 of the 26 sites were either empty,
     destroyed, or contained unidentified material withan imagery
     signature inconsistent with CW. One site was found to be a
     duplicate location under a different name and another was removed
     for lack of evidence. Teams from ISG visited the remaining eight
     sites.
     * ISG investigation of eight ASPs turned up a wealth of different
     Iraqi munitions including artillery shells, and rockets. However,
     we did not locate any CW filled artillery.

   In other words, the methodology adopted was tantamount to an opinion
   poll -- sample a handful of supposedly representative sites and assume
   they represent the whole. Fresh intelligence, gathered on the ground
   in Iraq, was never used to identify potential sites for investigation.
   The intelligence Gaubatz had gathered fell on deaf ears. There was
   [10]no time, no money and no reason to inspect in southern Iraq.

     "I have no doubts the sites were never exploited by ISG. We agents
     begged and begged for weeks and months to get ISG to respond to the
     sites with the proper equipment," Mr. Gaubatz said in a telephone
     interview. He returned to his wife and daughter in July 2003, and
     then wrote letters about the sites to more senior officials in
     military intelligence. But he said he never received any
     satisfactory response and says that to this day the sites have
     never been fully checked out.
     He says the reasons he was given by the survey group were that the
     areas of the sites were not safe, they lacked manpower and
     equipment, and at the time the survey group was focusing activities
     in northern Iraq. "The ISG team was not organized nor outfitted for
     this mission in my opinion and were only concerned to look in
     northern Iraq. They were not even on the ground during the first
     few weeks of the war, and this was the most critical time to go out
     and exploit sites. I feel very comfortable in saying the sites were
     never exploited by ISG," he said. In one instance a few inspectors
     did come out once to follow one lead, Mr. Gaubatz said. But they
     lacked the equipment and manpower to crack the bunker. "An adequate
     search would have required heavy equipment to uncover the concrete,
     and additional equipment to drain the water."

   Gaubatz, now back in the states, and thoroughly frustrated by the lack
   of action, stayed in contact with government personnel and Iraqis,
   anxiously awaiting the news that teams had arrived at the sites and
   exploitation was underway. The word never came.
   Meanwhile, [11]the media and [12]the left, began [13]loudly trumpeting
   the "news" that there were no WMD in Iraq, the supposed [14]one and
   only causus belli for Operation Iraqi Freedom was false and the
   President and his administration had lied to the American people. The
   admission by the ISG that they had not even scratched the surface of
   Iraq in their search was lost in the rising chorus of criticism. An
   election was on the way and the smell of political blood was in the
   air.
   Gaubatz's cause certainly wasn't helped by the [15]stunning admission
   of the administration that the famous [16]"sixteen words" of the 2003
   State of the Union address should not have been spoken, an admission
   that we [17]now know was [18]foolish in the extreme. Nor did he
   benefit from the [19]administration's admission in 2005 that we had
   [20]not found WMD in Iraq (not quite the same as the left's claim that
   there [21]never were any [22]WMD in Iraq.)
   Against the backdrop of inaction and political brouhahas, Gaubatz's
   frustration grew to disturbing levels. Anxious to see the sites
   inspected and the WMD recovered and destroyed, Gaubatz went on the
   offensive, speaking to anyone who would listen, telling his story and
   lobbying for attention from Congress.
   The results of his efforts, including possibly illegal activity by two
   United States Congressmen, will be the subject of the next article.

References

   1. http://www.antimedia.us/posts/1153798086.shtml
   2. http://www.antimedia.us/posts/1153893871.shtml
   3. http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1845
   4. http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/s1997-774.htm
   5. http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/Investigation/story?id=1623307&page=1
   6. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,200499,00.html
   7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2756987.stm
   8. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2810231.stm
   9. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2004/isg-final-report/isg-final-report_vol3_cw-06.htm
  10. http://www.davegaubatz.com/files/Ex-Officer_Spurned_on_WMD_Claim_08-Feb-2006.htm
  11. http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-09-02-WMD-indepth_x.htm
  12. http://www.truthout.org/docs_03/052403A.shtml
  13. http://newsbusters.org/node/4891
  14. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060412-8.html
  15. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030722-12.html
  16. http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/07/20/sprj.irq.wmd.investigation/
  17. http://www.factcheck.org/article222.html
  18. http://www.antimedia.us/posts/1153888020.shtml
  19. http://capitolhillcoffeehouse.com/chch_news_534.htm
  20. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7634313/
  21. http://www.counterthink.org/008590.html
  22. http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/169785_wmdside20.html